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LEGAL ORIENTALISM
Teemu Rusko/a*

[The] world-wide . . . diffusion of [Western culture] has protected us as
man had never been protected before from having to take seriously the
civilizations of other peoples; it has given to our culture a massive univer. sality that we have long ceased to account for historically, and which we
read off rather as necessary and inevitable. 1
- Ruth Benedict

[In China,] animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b)
embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray
dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumer
able, (k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, (1) et cetera, (m) having
just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies. 2
- Michel Foucault

* Assistant Professor of Law, American University; Sabbatical Visitor at the Center f or
the Study of Law and Culture and Senior Fellow at the Center for Chinese Legal Studies,
Columbia Law School. A.B., A.M. (East Asian Studies), Stanford; J.D. Yale. - Ed. I have
presented earlier drafts of this Article at several venues and thank the participants for their
fe edback: Colloquium on Cultural Theory, Historical Methods and the Study of Modem
China at Columbia University; Colloquium on Law and Culture at Columbia Law School;
Law, Culture and the Humanities conference at the University of Texas at Austin; Feminism
and Legal Theory Workshop at Cornell Law School; Law and Society Association annual
meeting in Budapest, Hungary; and Post-Colonial Law conference at American University,
Washington College of Law. I am especially indebted for their suggestions, questions, and
criticisms to Lama Abu-Odeh, Nathaniel Berman, David Eng, Karen Engle, Martha
Fineman, Peter Fitzpatrick, Katherine Franke, Maria Gomez, Dicle Kogacioglu, Prabha
Kotiswaran, Eugenia Lean, Benjamin Liebman, Christia Mercer, Thomas Metzger, Naomi
Mezey, Kunal Parker, Penny Pether, Elizabeth Povinelli, Catherine Powell, Anupama Rao,
Annelise Riles, Haun Saussy, Katherine Stone, Madhavi Sunder, Kendall Thomas, Leti
Volpp, and Joan Williams. Don Clarke and Randy Peerenboom provided especially detailed
and helpful criticism. At the inception of this project, I received critical feedback also from
Barbara Fried, Janet Halley, Stanley Lubman, Vicki Schultz, Bob Weisberg, and Jim
Whitman. I am indebted to Erika Evasdottir for enriching my reading of Gadamer, and to
Janet Jakobsen for insightful comments on the conclusion. A special thanks to John
Merryman for his generosity of spirit in supporting this project. Even where I have been
unable to answer the questions the above individuals have posed, they have sharpened my
argument at every turn. I gratefully acknowledge the expert research assistance of Kelly
Baldwin and Amy Ericksen. This project received generous financial support from Dean
Claudio Grossman at the Washington College of Law, as well as from Cornell Law School
where I finished the Article as a visiting faculty member. ©Michigan Law Review, Teemu
Ruskola.

1. RUTH BENEDICT, PAITERNS OF CULTURE 6 (1952).
2. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS, at xv {1993) [hereinafter FOUCAULT,
THE ORDER OF THINGS] (quoting a short story by JoRGE LUIS BORGES, The Analytical
Language of John Wilkins, in OTHER INQUISITIONS, 1937-1952, at 103 ( Ruth Simms trans.,
1964)).
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Fifty years ago comparative law was a field in search of a para
digm. In the inaugural issue of the American Journal of Comparative
Law in 1952, Myres McDougal remarked unhappily, "The greatest
confusion continues to prevail about what is being compared, about
the purposes of comparison, and about appropriate techniques."3 In
short, there seemed to be very little in the field that was not in a state
of confusion. Two decades later, referring to McDougal's bleak as
sessment, John Merryman saw no evidence of progress: "few compara
tive lawyers would suggest that matters have since improved."4 And
only a few years ago, John Langbein suggested that comparative law
remains in dire straits: "If the study of comparative law were to be
banned from American law schools tomorrow morning, hardly anyone
would notice."5
A certain amount of hand-wringing is thus de rigueur in any piece
of comparative law scholarship that wants to be viewed as part of the
solution rather than part of the problem. At the risk of perpetuating
the notion that comparative lawyers suffer from a "Cinderella com
plex, "6 I too begin with the obligatory observation that comparative
law remains a relatively underappreciated field in the legal academy.
My main purpose, however, is to join other recent voices seeking to
invigorate the field by proposing new avenues of inquiry.7
3. Myres McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarifi
cation as an Instrument of World Order, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 24, 28-29 (1952).
4. John Merryman, Comparative Law and Scientific Explanation, in LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 81, 82 n.3
( John N. Hazard & Wenceslas J. Wagner eds., 1974); see also JOHN MERRYMAN, THE
LONELINESS OF THE COMPARATIVE LAWYER AND OTHER ESSAYS (1999).
5. John Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM .
J. COMP. L. 545, 549 (1995). Mary Ann Glendon echoes the same observation: "American
comparativists, in fact, often find that our colleagues abroad welcome our enterprise more
than our colleagues at home." Mary Ann Glendon, Why Cross Boundaries?, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 971, 972 (1996).
6. Giinther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 41 1 , 419 (1985) (noting that comparative lawyers suffer from low discipli
nary self-esteem).
7. An eclectic bibliography of this growing literature includes the contributions to the
1997 Utah Law Review symposium, New Approaches to Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 255, as well as H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD:
SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW (2000); Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On
the "Rectification of Names" in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19 (1996); William
Alford, The Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 945 (1986)
[hereinafter Alford, The Limits of "Grand Theory"); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural
Immersion, Difference, and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 45
(1998); Nora Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Compara
tive Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 647 (1998); Nora Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism:
Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 737 (1999); Frankenberg, supra note 6;
David Gerber, System Dynamics: Toward a Language of Comparative Law?, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 719 {1998); Sharon Hom, Engendering Chinese Legal Studies, 1994 SIGNS 1 020
(Summer); Mitchel de S.-0.-l'E. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Comparative Liter
ary Analysis of American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, 111 HARV. L. REV.
689 (1998); Pierre Legrand, Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory, 58 Moo.
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Comparative law has existed in relative disciplinary isolation.8 This
Article is part of a larger effort to bring the mainstream of compara
tive law into conversation with other literatures: the study of non
Western law, the growing body of postcolonial theory, as well as re
cent work in legal theory. I apply these theoretical frameworks to
Chinese law and, more specifically, to the historic claim made by many
Western observers that China lacks an indigenous tradition of "law."
In the process, this Article traces a genealogy of certain Orientalist
understandings of Chinese law and explores the broader questions of
who gets to decide who has "law" and what the normative implications
of its absence are. In answering these questions, I suggest that law is a
crucial element in the constitution of the modem Western subject and
that, historically, ideas of the lack of Chinese legal subjectivity have
served to mark the outside of (Euro-American) law. My aim here is
not to condemn that history, which has already been critiqued by oth
ers. Instead, my primary goal is to understand how history has shaped
the field of knowledge in which the comparative study of Chinese law
unfolds today, and how the West has come to understand itself
through law. In these conditions, what are the ethics of comparison?
I.

LACK OF "LAW" I N

CH INA

As there is a literary canon that establishes what is and what is not litera
ture, there is also a legal canon that establishes what is and what is not
law. 9
- Boaventura de Sousa Santos

That the Chinese legal tradition is lacking is an observation as
cliched as the solicitude that is routinely expressed toward compara
tive law.10 "To all intents and purposes foreigners are completely in
the dark as to what and how law exists in China. Some persons whose
L. REV. 262 (1995) (book review); Ugo Mattei & Alberto Monti, Comparative Law & Eco·
nomics: Borrowing and Resistance, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, Vol. 1, lss. 2, Art. 5 (2001 ),
at http:l/www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/voll/iss2/art5/; Ugo Mattei & Anna di Robilant, The
Art and Science of Critical Scholarship: Postmodernism and International Style in the Legal
Architecture of Europe, 15 TULANE L. REV. 1053 (2001); Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke,
Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 800 (2000); Mathias
Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the lmernational Age, 15
TULANE L. REV. 1103 (2001); Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J.
221 (1999); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39
AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991).
8. Cf WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL THEORY 176-78 (2000) (ob
serving comparative law's failure to follow the developments of legal theory).
9. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 473 (1995).
10. I discuss this perception of Chinese law more fully in Teemu Ruskola, Law Without
Law, or Is "Chinese Law" an Oxymoron?, WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2002)
[hereinafter Ruskola, Law Without Law].
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reputation for scholarship stands high would deny the right of the
Chinese to any law whatsoever - incredibly, but to my knowledge, a
fact."11 This was one Western commentator's melancholic observation
at the end of the nineteenth century. The renowned anthropologist
Marcel Granet indeed announced in 1934, "The Chinese notion of
Order excludes, in all aspects, the idea of Law."12 And in William
Alford's recent observation, Western students of China continue to
ignore and misunderstand "the effect of law upon Chinese life."13
But just what does it mean to claim that China suffers from a (rela
tive or absolute) lack of "law"? After all, only the most negligent ob
server could miss the fact that imperial China boasted dynastic legal
codes going back to the Tang dynasty,14 and earlier. The point is usu
ally a subtler one: whatever law China has known is a form that falls
short of "real" law. This view is implicit in the oft-stated claim that
Chinese law has been historically exclusively penal and associated with
criminal sanctions.15 Especially in continental systems, civil law stands
at the heart of jurisprudence, and its absence thus signifies a gaping
hole at the center of the Chinese legal system.16 Sometimes, the im
plicit yardstick for "real" law is formal legal rationality in the
Weberian sense,17 while at other times it is a liberal legal order that
constrains the state in a particular way - a configuration often re
ferred to as "the rule of law."18 Legal historian Thomas Stephens has
11. ERNEST ALABASTER, NOTES AND COMMENTARIES ON CHINESE CRIMINAL LAW
.
AND COGNATE TOPICS WITH SPECIAL RELATION TO RULING CASES WITH A BRIEF
EXCURSUS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY, at v (1899).
12. MARCEL GRANET, PENSEE CHINOISE [CHINESE THOUGHT] 590 (1934) ("La notion
Chinoise de l'Ordre exclut, sur tous ses aspects, l'idee de Loi.").
13. William Alford, Law? What Law?, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA
45, 45 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Alford, Law? What Law?].
14. 618-907 C.E. Moreover, Legalism (ja-jia) was one of the leading schools of thought
in classical China and as such indisputably a part of the Chinese tradition (even if it was sub
sequently eclipsed by Confucianism). See, e.g., BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, THE WORLD OF
THOUGHT IN ANCIENT CHINA 321-49 (1985). Yet the Legalist conception of "law" was
purely instrumental, and as such susceptible to an Orientalist critique as not "real" law. Cf.
infra text accompanying notes 15-18.
·

15. See Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law
and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1618 (2000)
[hereinafter Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship], and sources cited therein.
16. Even in the view of common law observers, the mere presence of positive law civil or criminal - does not, by itself, make for a "legal system." See Perry Keller, Sources of
Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (1994) (disputing that China has a "legal sys
tem").
17. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF CHINA 102, 148-50 (Hans H. Gerth trans.,
1951) [hereinafter WEBER, THE RELIGION OF CHINA].
18. See generally W.J.F. JENNER, THE TYRANNY OF HISTORY: THE ROOTS OF CHINA'S
CRISIS (1992) {describing. China as the quintessential instance of the "rule of men," as op
posed to the "rule of law"). Cf. Rene David, On the Concept of "Western" Law, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 126, 131 (1 983) (identifying "Western law" with " 'the rule of law,' the supremacy of
law; [and] the Rechsstaat"). Even the eminent China historian John King Fairbank agrees

Legal Orienta/ism

October 2002]

183

'

.

recently argued that Chinese law is not even worthy of the term "jurisprudence." As a more descriptive term for the study of Chinese
non-law, Stephens offers the neologism "obsequiiprudence," pre
sumably signifying the scholarly study of obsequious submission to
authority and hierarchy.19 Whatever the merits of Stephens' thesis may
be, in the view of nineteenth-century international lawyers Chinese
law was so "uncivilized" as to exclude China from the "Family of
Nations," which in turn served as a justification for reducing the coun
try to a semi-colonial status under a regime of Western extraterritorial
privileges.20
The goal of this Article is not to defend Chinese law, whether past,
present or future. Ultimately, the answer to the question whether or
not there is law in China is always embedded in the premises of the
questioner: it necessarily depends on the observer's definition of law.
Hence, my aim here is not to "prove" that there is in fact such a thing
as a tradition of Chinese "law." Indeed, there already exists a consid
erable scholarly literature on Chinese law (however defined), and
among students of Chinese law the idea of China's inherent lawless
ness - at least in the crude form of the thesis - is a discredited no
tion.21
•

.

with the general thesis that China lacks both a tradition of private law as well as a system of
rule of law in general. See JOHN KING FAIRBANK, CHINA: A NEW l:llSTORY 1 85-86 (1992).
Fa.irbank's life-long theme of Chinese lawlessness already permeates much of his masterly
TRADE AND DIPLOMACY ON THE CHINA COAST: THE OPENING OF THE TREATY PORTS
1842-1854 (1953). As Tani Barlow incisively analyzes Trade ahd Diplomacy on the China
Coast:
What the West "had" that China did not, what in the end.seduced China into passive acqui
escence (made it Other) was Law. Or, to put it slightly differently, the universalist Law of
treaty, human rights, science, and so on clarified the difference between China and the West
as a relation of absence and presence, by pointing out the anarchic, ever multiplying, seeth
ing differences within China; China, alas, stood to Western Law as the particular stands to
Universal. And, I would hazard, that is why the theme of "lawfulness" takes on such epic
proportions in Fairbank's text.
Tani E. Barlow, &>1611ialism's Career in China Studies, in FORMATIONS OF COLONIAL
MODERNITY IN EAST ASIA 373, 389-90 (Tani E. Barlow ed., 1997).
19. THOMAS B. STEPHENS, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA: THE SHANGHAI MIXED
COURT 1911-27, at 115 (1992). While one can in good faith argue about the possibility of
comparative Jaw across cultures and times, Stephens' coinage is gratuitously offensive. For a
critical assessment of Stephens' view of Chinese law, see Ruskola, Law Without Law, supra
note 10.
20. See generally GERRIT w. GONG, THE STANDARD OF 'CIVILIZATION' IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 130-63 (1984).
21. For one thing, many studies have already debunked the thesis that the Chinese legal
tradition is exclusively penal. See, e.g., CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA (Kath
ryn Bernhardt & Philip c.c. Huang eds., 1994); PHILIP c.c. H UANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN
CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE IN THE QING (1996). Thomas Metzger goes so fa r
as to suggest that by late Qing the Chinese suffered not from an absence of law but, if any
thing, an excessive concern for it, or "overlegality." THOMAS A. METZGER, THE INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION OF CH'ING BUREAUCRACY: LEGAL, NORMATIVE, AND COMMUNICATION
ASPECTS 18 (1973). In addition to the discovery of Chinese "civil law," there are also many
defenses of Confucian traditions of "liberalism" and "constitutionalism" as well as various
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However, outside of the academic study of Chinese law, ideas of
China's lawlessness continue to abound. Indeed, one of the primary
obstacles to a serious discussion of Chinese law are the blank stares
with which one is frequently met upon confessing an interest in the
subject: "What Chinese 'law'? There is no law in China! " (Sometimes
followed by a more tentative, "ls there law in China?") Unlike the
more traditional comparativist who studies French or German law, for
example, the student of Chinese law frequently needs to convince her
audience that the subject matter exists in the first place.
In this Article, however, I do not address the substantive argu
ments in the debate on Jaw's existence in China. I do so not because
there is no merit in engaging in this debate,22 but because for present
purposes, my primary interest is in analyzing how the West has con
structed its cultural identity against China in terms of law. Why, de
spite vigorous efforts to debunk it, does the view of China's lawless
ness continue to prevail - not only in the popular opinion and among
policy-makers, but even among legal scholars who do not specialize in
China as well as China scholars who do not specialize in law?23 Chi
nese civil law, for example, has been discovered and re-discovered pe
riodically in the West. What preconceptions make it possible for it to
be discovered and forgotten again so quickly, leaving it to wait for yet
another round of "discovery"?
There are no doubt multiple answers to this complex of questions.
This Article directs the inquiry into a certain historiographic tradition
it calls "legal Orientalism." It starts from the premise that, in many
ways, "history does not belong to us; we belong to it."24 Inevitably,
" [o]ur historical consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices
in which the echo of the past is heard."25 The Orientalist history of
comparative law constitutes one important tradition from which the
work of today's comparative lawyers emerges, and whether we con
sciously reject or embrace that tradition, it still provides the context
Chinese conceptions of "rights." An eclectic selection of this large literature includes
STEPHEN C. ANGLE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE THOUGHT (2002); CONFUCIANISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wm. Theodore de Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998); WM. THEODORE
DE BARY, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN CHINA (1983); Janet E. Ainsworth, Interpreting Sa
cred Texts: Preliminary Reflections on Constitutional Discourse in China, 43 H ASTINGS L.J.
273 (1992); Wm. Theodore de Bary, The "Constitutional Tradition" in China, 9 J. CHINESE
L. 7 (1 995); Ju-ao Mei, China and the Rule of Law, 5 PAC. AFF. 863 (1 932); Richard
Vuylsteke, Tung Chung-shu: A Philosophical Case for Rights in Chinese Philosophy, in LAW
AND SOCIETY: CULTURE LEARNING THROUGH LAW 303 (1977).
22. I have participated in the debate myself by arguing that China in fact has a tradition
of "corporation law" despite historic claims to the contrary. See Ruskola, Conceptualizing
Corporations and Kinship, supra note 1 5.
23. Cf. Alford, Law? What Law?, supra note 1 3.
24. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 276 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald
G. Marshall eds., Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1 989) (1960).
25. Id. at 284.
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against which that work is written, read, understood, and misunder
stood. As David Halperin describes the marvelous efficiency with
which prejudice relies on unstated "truths" in communication, "if the
message is already waiting at the receiver's end, it doesn't even need
to be sent; it just needs to be activated."26 Whatever our own "preju
dices" about Chinese law may be - and they may be either positive or
negative - in our writings we are likely to be activating messages of
which we are not even aware. By elaborating a genealogy of legal
Orientalism, I hope to analyze some prevailing cultural prejudices that
inform the interpretation of comparative scholarship on Chinese Law.
Stated differently, this Article is an attempt to take account of the
context in which the study of Chinese law necessarily unfolds, and to
understand the historicity of contemporary scholarship. What can we
learn from the history of comparative law and, indeed, from the his
tory of Chinese legal history?27 I suggest that by considering legal
Orientalism as an ongoing cultural tradition we can understand better
why even today claims about the status of Chinese law are so relent
lessly normative. Why is it that the statement that China lacks "law"
(again, however defined) is almost never simply a factual claim but
constitutes an implicit indictment of China and its cultural traditions?
Below, I analyze the processes by which claims of the putative ab
sence of law in China have become part of the observers' cultural
identity and, in tum, contribute to the contents of the observations
themselves. In the final analysis, the object of my inquiry is certain
Western representations of Chinese law and the notions of legality
and legal subjectivity that they imply. The project is ultimately herme
neutical in Gadamer's sense: its goal is "not to develop a procedure"
for understanding Chinese law "but to clarify the conditions in which
[such] understanding takes place."28 Whether we like it or not, legal
Orientalism is one condition of Western knowledge of Chinese law.
However, while we in the West are perhaps bemused to learn of
the traditional Sinocentric worldview - the Chinese word for "China"
means "Middle Kingdom" - we nevertheless accept with utmost un
selfconsciousness the notion that we are the First World, twice
removed from the soi-disant Third World. To be sure, the distance is
shrinking, as the Second World has essentially disappeared. Yet our
occidental solipsism aside, cultures do not come labeled with ordinal
numbers. Given the traditional Eurocentrism of legal scholarship,29
perhaps the category of "law" obscures more than it illuminates; might

26. DAVID M. HALPERIN, ST. FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 13 (1995).
27. Cf id. at 299 ("Real historical thinking must take account of its own historicity.").
28. Id. at 295.
29. Cf Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAW & INEQ. 323 (1997).
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we not be better off with the study of, say, "comparative social con
trol," rather than comparative law?30
In the words of Dipesh Chakrabarty, European analytical catego
ries are "both indispensable and inadequate in helping us to think
through the experiences of political modernity in non-Western na
tions."31 Chakrabarty's response to this predicament is the project of
"provincializing Europe": de-centering Western analytic categories
and subjecting them and their histories to critical scrutiny. However,
given the fact that European thought is now "everybody's heritage . . .
and affect[s] us all," the task is not, and cannot be, the ultimate elimi
nation of all analytic apparatuses of European thought, such as
Western ideas of law. More productively, Chakrabarty wants to ex
plore how European traditions "may be renewed from and for the
margins."32 One aspect of provincializing Europe must be provincial
izing - rather than discarding - Euro-American conceptions of law
and its categories.33 I do so here by analyzing the historical construe30. Anthropologists John Comaroff and Simon Roberts answer this question affirma
tively in the context of legal anthropology. " [T]he argument for perpetuating a discrete an
thropology of law, if this implies the continued reification 'the legal,' is not compelling," they
argue, proposing instead the study of the logic of dispute processes in their cultural context.
JOHN COMAROFF & SIMON ROBERTS, RULES AND PROCESSES: THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF
DISPUTE IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT 249 (1 981).
31 . DtPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT
AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 1 6 (2000) .
32. Id.
33. Cf. MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF J USTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 1 99 (1986) (observing that a definition
of "law" so narrow as to exclude China "smacks of the dogmatism of the untraveled"). This
project of provincializing law has already begun on several fronts. Important examples of
general, and growing, theoretical interest in analyzing the relationship between law_ and co
lonialism include LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds.,
1999); PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW (2001); Symposium,
Colonialism, Culture, and the Law, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 305 (2001); Symposium, Post
Colonial Law - Uses of Theory in Law Reform Projects, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y
& L. 535 (2001 ); and Symposium, Re-Orienting Law and Sexuality, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1
(2000) ; Special Issue, Postcolonialism, Globalization and Law, 1999 THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUD. 1. There are a growing number of postcolonial analyses in many legal sub-fields as
well, including intellectual property (e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture
and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural A ppropriation Contro
versy, 6 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 249 (1 993)), immigration (e.g., Tayyab Mahmud, Migration,
Identity, and the Colonial Encounter, 76 OR. L. REV. 633 (1997)), environmental law (e.g.,
Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmenwl Law in Postcolonial Societies: Straddling the Local
Global Institutional Spectrum, 1 1 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (2000) ), and critical
race theory (e.g., Chantal Thomas, Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development The
ory: Observations on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1 1 95 (2000) ; Eric K. Yamamoto, Re
thinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33
(1 995)). Increasingly, even "domestic" American legal phenomena are being viewed through
the lens of colonialism. See, e.g., FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO,
AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Mar
shall eds., 2001 ); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAII: THE CULTURAL POWER OF
LAW (2000); Wendy Nelson Espeland, Bureaucrats and Indians in a Contemporary Colonial
Encounter, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 403 (2001); Laura Gomez, Race, Colonialism, and
Criminal Law: Mexicans and the American Criminal Justice System in Territorial New Mex-
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tion of the Euro-American legal subject against its Chinese counter
part, and the implications of that history for the study of Chinese law
today.
What, then, are the connotations of "law" and how do they color
our relationship to the political and cultural entity we refer to as
"China"? The shortcomings of Chinese law are often blamed on a pu
tative confusion of categories - the tendency of the Chinese to con
flate law and morality, or law and custom, for example. Such claims
have great intuitive appeal. Like the brilliantly patronizing Chinese
encyclopaedia entry in one of the two epigraphs to this Article, de
scribed by Michel Foucault in the preface to The Order of Things,34
they accord with expectations of Chinese taxonomical madness and
irreducible cultural difference. Yet what many readers of Foucault ig
nore is that the amusing encyclopaedia entry that he quotes is not a
real encyclopaedia entry at all. It is a quotation from a fable by Jorge
Luis Borges which Foucault uses artfully to set up an epistemological
foil for European systems of knowledge.35 One assumes - though one
cannot be quite sure - that Foucault is acting self-consciously in do
ing so.36 In any event, what is certain is that many enduring Western
notions of Chinese law are based on Orientalist fables and betray little
self-awareness of this fact.
This fabulous Western jurisprudence of Chinese law is the subject
matter of the remainder of this Article, which proceeds as follows.
Part II first describes the limits of functionalism, the dominant theo
retic paradigm in comparative law, and proposes the analysis of "legal
Orientalism" as an alternative point of departure. Before turning to
the Oriental other, Part III analyzes the general processes by which
law participates in the construction of the culturally and nationally
marked Western subject. Part IV, the core of the Article, sketches
how the Euro-American legal subject has imagined its relationship, in
various historical contexts, to its Oriental counterpart, the Chinese
non-legal non-subject. Part V turns to the contemporary implications
of the history of legal Orientalism. Since all understanding is situated,
bias is inevitable and prejudice the very condition of knowledge.
Rather than issuing an impossible call for an end to all Orientalism, I
ico, 34 LAW & Soc. REV. 1129 (2000); Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of
American Colonialism: The Insular Cases, 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996); Ediberto Roman,
Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119
(1997).

34. See supra note 2.
35. Foucault does not provide a citation to Borges' story, although he does (correctly)
identify Borges as the author. See BORGES, supra note 2.
36. Indeed, despite some effort to maintain distance to Borges' outrageous "Chinese
encyclopaedia," Foucault ends up sounding utterly patronizing when he patiently suggests
that we cannot dismiss "with complete certainty" the validity of the "Chinese" (?!) classifica
tion of animals into "tame" and "embalmed," for instance. FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at xix.
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turn to an ethics of Orientalism. In an important sense, the process of
comparison creates the objects of comparison. Therefore, how we
compare ourselves to others produces both enabling conditions as well
as obstacles to further communication. An ethical legal Orientalism
attends to the conditions of legal subject formation: rather than posit
ing the Chinese as simply lacking legal subjectivity, it allows for the
possibility of differently constituted legal subjects. Indeed, a more
open-ended approach to comparison may change our views not only
of others as legal subjects, but also of ourselves.
II.

BEYOND FUNCTIONALISM

One of the aims of this Article is to help move comparative law
beyond functionalism. In order to do so, Section A provides a short
account of functionalism, followed by an analysis of its limits in
Section B. Section C develops a preliminary definition of "legal
Orientalism." Section D in turn considers the methodological limits of
the study of legal Orientalism.
A. Functionalism
Although much of the work in comparative law remains method
ologically unselfconscious, the dominant methodology is without· a
doubt functionalism, whether or not expressly avowed by its practitio
ners. The basic idea of functionalism - originally imported into com
parative law from the social sciences - is powerfully simple.37 The
functionalist's task is to identify some type of more or less universal
problem shared by several societies, and then analyze how different
legal systems solve the same problem; the legal solutions, by defini
tion, will be functionally equivalent and hence comparable.38 For in37. For a classic statement of sociological functionalism, see TALCOTI PARSONS, THE
SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951). The appeal of functionalism is by no means limited to comparative
law. It animates much of law-and-society scholarship and legal history as well, where it im
plies an evolutionary paradigm for the understanding of legal change. In the words of
Lawrence Friedman, for example,
Law, by and large, evolves; it changes in piecemeal fashion .... (W]hat is kept of old law is
highly selective. Society in change may be slow, but it is ruthless. Neither evolution nor
revolution is sentimental. Old rules of law and old legal institutions stay alive when they still
have a purpose - or, at least, when they do not interfere with the demands of current
life. . . . [W]orking doctrines of law, however quaint they may seem, must be acting as the
servants of some economic or social interest.
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 18, 23 (2d ed. 1985). On the role of
functionalism (or "adaptationism," as Gordon calls it) in legal history, see generally Robert
Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981).
38. For a textbook example, see LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES ( John
Barton et al. eds., 1983) (hereinafter LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES] (analyz
ing the treatment of "inheritance," "embezzlement," "contract," and "population control" in
the laws of "the West," Egypt, Botswana, and China).
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stance, scholars of Chinese law have frequently observed that many of
our legal dispute resolution functions were performed in traditional
China by extra-judicial mechanisms, such as the family.39 Likewise,
prominent observers have argued that Confucian ritual (li) constituted
the Chinese equivalent of natural law in early modem West.40
B.

Limits of Functionalism

In the social sciences, functionalism largely exhausted itself by the
1980s. However, it retains a tenacious hold on the imagination of
comparative lawyers.41 While it remains a useful tool in the hands of a
sophisticated practitioner, functionalism (like all methods) has notable
limits.42 Despite its apparent value neutrality, it is premised on the
39. See, e.g., SYBILLE VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA:
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 80-96 (1962). In employing the term "traditional China," I am
aware that in the conventional division of Chinese history into "traditional" and "modern,''
the latter adjective "usually refer[s] to the period of significant contact with the modern
West." PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY IN CHINA: AMERICAN H ISTORICAL
WRITINGS ON THE RECENT CHINESE PAST 58 (1984) (hereinafter COHEN, DISCOVERING
HISTORY]. In this Article (as elsewhere), I use the phrase "traditional China" simply to de
note a certain historical period, without any intent to imply a particular normative vision of
history. Cf Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship, supra note 15, at 1614 n.37.
40. See, e.g., JOSEPH NEEDHAM, Human Laws and the Laws of Nature in China and the
West, in 2 SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA 518 (1956); Hu Shih, The Natural Law in
the Chinese Tradition, in 5 UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS 119 (Edward F. Barrett ed., 1953). Unless otherwise indicated, in the remain
der of this Article I use the terms "Confucian" and "Confucianism" to refer to the state ide
ology perpetuated by the imperial civil service examination system, with full awareness that
this definition does not exhaust alternative meanings. As I have noted previously, "On the
one hand, this orthodox Confucianism, which grew increasingly rigid over time, stood in con
trast to the philosophical Confucianisms in which it originated. On the other hand, it was
also distinct from the Confucian officialdom's actual policies and administrative practices,
which did not necessarily conform to the state's professed ideals." Ruskola, Conceptualizing
Corporations and Kinship, supra note 15, at 1607 n.18.
41. Cf June Starr & Jane Collier, Introduction, in HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY
OF LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5 ( June Starr & Jane Collier eds.,
1989) [hereinafter HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW] ("Many anthropologists
who studied dispute management in the 1960s and 1970s experienced a sense of paradigm
crisis by 1980, as did most social anthropologists, because functionalist theory (the frame
work within which we previously worked), was increasingly criticized.").
42. That is to say, I am not rejecting functionalism in all forms and for all purposes. In
deed, if "function" is conceived broadly enough, the label "functionalism" can subsume al
most any methodology. Even laws that seem to serve no function other than that of making
an ideological statement (or, less tendentiously, expressing a collective value judgment) can
be analyzed as serving an ideological (or expressive) function. However, I am not invested
- either positively or negatively - in the label itself, and my goal here is simply to examine
the limits of a particular mode of analysis that is conventionally associated with that label,
viz., sociological functionalism. This mainstream functionalism has its uses and I have used it
myself, suggesting that in late imperial China family law performed many of the economic
functions that corporation law performs in the United States today. In recognition of its lim
its, however, I have sought to combine the functionalist inquiry with a hermeneutic analysis.
See Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship, supra note 15, at 1613 (arguing that
while American and Chinese corporation law share many functional similarities, as systems
of meaning they remain far apart).
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identification of a problem that the law then solves. Yet it is not clear
just what constitutes a "problem"; what is a problem in one culture
may not be a problem in another.43 Furthermore, functionalists often
make implicit assumptions about which problems should be resolved
by legal, rather than some other, means.44 At its worst, functionalism
leads to a kind of epistemological imperialism: either we find in for
eign legal cultures confirmation of the (projected) universality of our
own legal categories, or, equally troublingly, we find "proof" of the
fact that other legal cultures lack some aspect or other of our law.
The colonial administration of British India offers a prime example
of the first kind of conceptual colonialism. Describing the attempt of
Sir William Jones to discover the principles of indigenous Hindu law,
Bernard Cohn argues that what started "as a search for the 'Ancient
Indian Constitution,' ended with what [Jones] had so much wanted to
avoid - with English law as the law of India."45 The reason was sim
ple. As Jones set out to find "a Hindu civil law," his focus was on sub
jects that he, "a Whig in political and legal philosophy, was centrally
concerned with - those rights, public and private, that affected the
ownership and transmission of property."46 Unsurprisingly, Jones
found precisely what he set out to find, which is indeed the hallmark
of an enterprising functionalist.
As a perhaps trivial, yet telling, example of the opposite danger the failure to find equivalents of one's own categories - consider the
following anecdote from the classroom. Upon reading Hugh Scogin's

43. The case of corporation law in China provides an extraordinary illustration: the cen
tral problem of American corporation law has become the solution to the key problem of
Chinese business organization. Since the classic analysis by Berle and Means, the separation
of ownership and management has constituted the so-called "agency problem" that Ameri
can corporation law seeks to address. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1937). When China enacted a
Company Law, it did so with the express hope that creating a separation of ownership and
management- the American agency problem
would solve the (very different) problems
of its state-owner enterprises. This ironic twist has gone largely unremarked in the literature
on Chinese business organization, except for Donald Clarke and William Simon. See Donald
Clarke, GA TT Membership for China?, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV . 517, 524 (1994); William
H. Simon, The Legal Structure of the Chinese "Socialist Market" Enterprise, 21 J. CORP. L.
267 (1996); cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Over
laps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 874
(1993) ("To date, comparative analyses of the Japanese corporate governance system have
assumed that the central purpose of the Japanese system, like that of the American system,
is solving the Berle-Means monitoring problem.").
-

44. Gtinther Frankenberg criticizes this assumption as "legocentrism," or the tendency
to treat law "as a given and a necessity, as the natural path to ideal, rational or optimal con
flict resolution and ultimately to a social order guaranteeing peace and harmony."
Frankenberg, supra note 6, at 445.
45. BERNARD s. COHN, Law and the Colonial State in India, in COLONIALISM AND ITS
FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE 57 (1996).
46. Id. at 71 .
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article on Chinese "contract law" in the Han dynasty47 (and Scogin's
highly contextualized study certainly indicates the need for the scare
quotes),48 a student of Janet Ainsworth's queried her urgently, "Tell
me . . . [h ]ad the Chinese developed promissory estoppel [by the HanJ,
too?" As Ainsworth observes tartly, the student
apparently regarded the development of the concept of promissory es
toppel as a natural evolutionary outgrowth of the law of contracts, such
that any civilization possessed of a j urisprudence of contract doctrine

would eventually produce the functional equivalent of Section 90 of the

Restatement of Contracts.49
At its extreme, a relentless insistence on exact equivalence can lead a
functionalist to conclude that China lacks even the very category of
"law."
In functionalism's favor, one should note that there is nothing
about it as a methodology that compels one to find either a presence
or an absence in (place of) the object of comparison.50 Historically, the
more contemporary variants of functionalism - unlike, say,
nineteenth-century evolutionary functionalisms - have in fact tended
to find even "primitive" legal systems less, rather than more, lacking.
Indeed, insofar as functionalism is premised on the existence of certain
universally shared conditions, it embodies the potential to make the
exotic Other seem ultimately rational, rather than merely "primitive."
As Max Gluckman insists in his classic ethnography of tribal law, "it is
unfortunately still necessary to demonstrate that Africans . . . use pro
cesses of inductive and deductive reasoning which are in essence
similar to those of the West, even if the premises be different."51

47. 206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.
48. Hugh T. Scogin, J r., Between Heaven and Man: Contract and the State in Han Dy
nasty China, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1326 (1990).
49. Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 20.
50. For Max Weber, for example, the main problem from which the Chinese legal tradi
tion suffered was that it had no concept of "natural law." WEBER, THE RELIGION OF CHINA,
supra note 17, at 147. This is precisely the opposite conclusion of two other eminent observ
ers, Hu Shih, supra note 40, and NEEDHAM, supra note 40 - a prime illustration of the ulti
mate indeterminacy of functionalism.

51. MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN
RHODESIA (1955). Thanks to Don Clarke for pointing me to Gluckman, and to Haun Saussy
for insisting on historically positive contributions of functionalism. Other similar analyses of
"primitive law" include KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE
WAY: CONFLICT AND CASELAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941); BRONISLAW
MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY. For an important recent example
in the genre of a law school casebook, see LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES,
supra note 38.
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Indeed, understanding as a continuous intellectual endeavor is nothing but
the rigorous critique of misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and all sorts
of cultural myths and misconceptions. 52
- Zhang Longxi

If comparison is such an inherently risky enterprise, is there any
way to talk about Chinese law without implicating oneself in the peril
ous act of comparison? Comparativists in fact often insist on a distinc
tion between the study of "foreign law" and the discipline of "com
parative Jaw": the latter consists of the express comparison of two
legal systems, rather than mere description of foreign legal systems.53
Yet it seems inescapable that the description of foreign law - includ
ing Chinese law - is always an instance of comparative law: even in
"mere description," the implicit point of reference is always our own
system, against which we compare the object culture.s4
Indeed, the description of Chinese law does not occur in a vacuum.
Edward Said, the literary scholar and leading postcolonial theorist,
uses the term "Orientalism" to refer to the discourses that structure
Westerners' understanding of the Orient.ss He emphasizes the extent
to which the identity of the colonial and postcolonial West is a rhetori
cal achievement. In a series of imperial gestures, we have reduced "the
Orient" to a passive object, to be known by a cognitively privileged
subject - ourselves, "the West." Exhorts Said,
Without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly un

derstand the enormously systematic discipline by which European cul

ture was able to manage - even produce - the Orient politically, so
ciologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively
during the post-Enlightenment period.56

52. ZHANG LONGXI, MIGHTY OPPOSITES: FROM DICHOTOMIES TO DIFFERENCE IN
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHINA 2 ( 1998) .
53. Merryman, supra note 4, at 82; cf TWINING, supra note 8, at 187 ("Comparatists
sometimes insist on a quite sharp distinction between foreign and comparative law.").
54. Cf Curran, supra note 7, at 45 (arguing that "comparison is central to all legal analy
sis, as it is central even to the very process of understanding"). Indeed, while "description" is
often used as an epithet to characterize legal scholarship, the difficulty of "mere description"
itself is easily underestimated in the context of comparative law. See, e.g., Alford, The Limits
of "Grand Theory," supra note 7 (emphasizing the importance of "thick description" in the
Geertzian sense); cf CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory
of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973) .
55. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978) [hereinafter SAID, ORIENTALISM] ; see also
Edward Said, Orienta/ism Reconsidered, in LITERATURE, POLITICS, AND THEORY 210
(Francis Barker et al. eds., 1986); Edward Said, Orienta/ism: A n Afterword, 14 RARITAN 32
(1995).
56. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 55, at 3. In describing Orientalism as a "discourse,''
Said employs it in an explicitly Foucaultian sense, especially as developed in MICHEL
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What remains largely absent in comparative law is the study of specifi
cally legal forms of Orientalism: the ways in which "the Orient" - as
well as "the West"57 - have been produced through the rhetoric of
law. Below, this Article turns to Euro-American representations of
Chinese law and analyzes their rhetorical processes as a kind of "legal
Orientalism."
Before proceeding, however, I should emphasize that I am using
the term "Orientalism" in this Article in the technical sense defined by
Edward Said and elaborated by other postcolonial theorists.58 There is
an important existing literature criticizing legal notions held by Orien
talist scholars, yet these critiques do not necessarily offer an "Orien
talist" analysis in the postcolonial sense in which I employ the term.
Although the existing critiques are too varied to be characterized as a
single genre, they tend to be modernist in their orientation: by demon
strating the inaccuracies in classical Orientalist scholars' depictions,
their preferred strategy is to rehabilitate the Chinese as authentic
FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1972) and MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH
OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH] . Yet just as Foucault has been faulted for lacking a concept of agency that would
allow for more than merely local resistance to disciplinary discourses, Said's concept of
Orientalism as a discourse has also been criticized as too hegemonic for not allowing "the
Orient" a role in its construction. See, e.g., Dennis Porter, Orientatism and Its Problems, in
THE POLITICS OF THEORY 179 (Francis Barker et al. eds., 1983). Partly in response to such
criticisms, in later work Said seeks to provide a broader study of imperialism that encom
passes "a general world-wide pattern of imperial culture" and incorporates also "a historical
experience of resistance against empire." EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM, at
xii (1993). Indeed, much of the subsequent development of postcolonial theory - most no
tably the work of Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha - can be viewed as an effort to resist
totalizing readings of Orientalism, with increasing emphasis on the cultural hybridity, psy
chological ambivalence, and geographic diaspora of (post)colonial subjects.

57. I use the term "the West" advisedly, acknowledging fully that "the West" does not
exist as an undifferentiated, monolithic entity any more than "the Orient" does. As used in
this Article, both terms refer to discursive constructions rather than fixed geographic loca
tions. To state the obvious, both "Westerners" and "Orientals" Jive in space as well, not
merely in "discourse." Yet, as Haun Saussy aptly observes, with reference to the idea of the
West, " 'Western' is the accurately vague word." HAUN SAUSSY, Postmodernism in China, in
GREAT WALLS OF DISCOURSE AND OTHER ADVENTURES IN CULTURAL CHINA 118, 120
(2001). Recent studies of Chinese transnationality illustrate that, geographically, Chinese
cultural formations in fact span "the West" and "the East." See, e.g., MADELINE Hsu,
DREAMING OF GOLD, DREAMING OF HOME: TRANSNATIONALISM AND MIGRATION
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH CHINA, 1882-1943 (2001); ADAM MCKEOWN,
CHINESE MIGRANT NETWORKS AND CULTURAL CHANGE: PERU, CHICAGO, HAWAII,
1900-1936 (2001); AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF
TRANSNATIONALITY (1999).
58. While this Article seeks to analyze Chinese law through the lens of Orientalism,
there are at least two other studies that also employ the term "legal Orientalism" - one in
order to analyze the British colonial legal system in Burma, and the other to deconstruct the
category of "Asian law" as used in Australia. See Hilary McGeachy, The Invention of Bur
mese Buddhist Law: A Case Study in Legal Orientalism, 4 AUST. J. ASIAN L. 31 (2002)
(analyzing British colonial administration of Burma); Veronica Taylor, Beyond Legal Ori
enta/ism, in ASIAN LAWS THROUGH AUSTRALIAN EYES 47 (Veronica Taylor ed., 1997)
(contesting "Asian law" as a category).
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subjects of (legal) modernity. Postcolonial analyses differ in their em
phasis. Rather than seeking to rescue China into a broader definition
of modernity, they emphasize the historical construction of China, and
the "non-West" in general, as "traditional" and "pre-modern" by
definition.59
D. Limits of Legal Orienta/ism
Although no study of non-Western law can be complete without
taking account of Orientalist discourses, such critical analyses (like
their functionalist counterparts) have their limits, defined by the ques
tions they ask.
First, there is no one definitive version of Orientalism.60 The West
has many Oriental (and other) Others, which vary enormously in
terms of their particular fe atures and histories - even while they all
share in being defined by their relationship to the West, with different
Others confirming different aspects of the West's self-understanding.61
59. Indeed, what a postcolonial analysis adds to other critiques is demonstrating the mu
tually constitutive nature of categories such as "modern/traditional" and "West
ern/Oriental." That is to say, the "problem" to be addressed is not simply that individual
scholars such Hegel or Marx, for example, may have been "Orientalist" in their views but
that "Orientalism" as a worldview is built into the very idea of modern (Western) legality a point that emerges even more clearly when the postcolonial analysis is combined with the
constitutive theory of law. See infra Section I l l.A. Although the modernist and postcolonial
critiques that I have sketched here are analytically distinct, their interventions can be com
plementary. The claim that China lacks "law," for example, can be contested by either ar
guing how and why China does have law (in the modern sense), or by showing how law has
been historically constructed to exclude China from it definitionally. Elsewhere, I have my
self engaged in what I here call the modernist project: expanding the definition of Western
"corporation law" lo include the operation of Chinese family law. See Ruskola, Conceptual
izing Corporations anti Kinship, supra note 15. For important contemporary examples of
critiques of Orientalist analyses of Chinese law - primarily, though not exclusively, in the
modernist mode see, e.g., Alford, supra note 7; William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occi
dental: Roberto Unger's Uses and Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 915 (1986)
[hereinafter Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental]; Randall Peerenboom, The X-Files: Past and
Present Portrayals of China's Alien "Legal System," GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. (forthcoming
2003); Hugh Scogin, Civil "Law" in Traditional China: History and Theory, in CIVIL LAW IN
QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA, supra note 21 , at 13.
60. Indeed, the term "postcolonial theory" itself is a placeholder for numerous theoreti
cal positions of various degrees of historical specificity. Cf. Stephen Siemon, The Scramble
for Post-Colonialism, in DE-SCRIBING EMPIRE: POSTCOLONIALISM AND TEXTUALITY 15,
16 (Chris Tiffin & Alan Lawson eds., 1994) (" ' Post-colonialism,' as it is now used in its vari
ous fields, describes a remarkably heterogeneous set of subject positions, profe ssional fields,
and critical enterprises.").
61. This structural fe ature of Orientalist discourse is indeed not even limited to ideas of
the Orient, however it is defined geographically, culturally, or temporally. Consider, for ex
ample, the close affinity between Said's Orientalism and Toni Morrison's description of
"Africanism," or the creation of an imaginary "Africa" in American literature:
Africanism is the vehicle by which the American self knows itself as not enslaved, but free;
not repulsive, but desirable; not helpless, but licensed and powerful; not history-less, but his
torical; not damned, but innocent; not a blind accident of evolution, but the progressive ful
fillment of destiny.
-
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Postcolonial analyses of law tend to be further developed in the con
text of the Middle East and South Asia, due at least in part to the fact
that many of the classic works of postcolonial theory focus on those
geographic areas.62 In this Article, Chinese law functions as one in
stance of Orientalism, not a paradigmatic case.63 Indeed, there are
multiple legal Orientalisrns as well. Although I focus here on certain
historically dominant representations of Chinese law, there are other

TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION
52 (1992). For examples of what might be called "legal Africanism," or analyses of the ways
in which Hegel's Africa has functioned as one of the West's several legal Others, see
FITZPATRICK, supra note 33; Robert Bernasconi, Hegel in the Courts of Ashanti, in HEGEL
AFTER DERRIDA 41 (Stuart Barnett ed., 1998). On the differentiation between Africa and
Asia in the modern context, see also GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, OUTSIDE IN THE
TEACHING MACHINE 53-54 (1993).
62. For works on the subcontinent, see, for example, RADHIKA SINGHA, A DESPOTISM
OF LAw: CRIME AND JUSTICE IN EARLy COLONIAL INDIA (1998); Upendra Baxi, " The
State's Emissary": The Place of Law in Subaltern Studies, in 7 SUBALTERN STUDIES:
WRITINGS ON SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY ( Partha Chatterjee & Gyanendra
Pandey eds., 1992); Ratna Kapur, Postcolonial Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Cul
ture, Sex and the Nation in India, 1 0 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 333 (2001 ); Prabha
Kotiswaran, Preparing for Civil Disobedience: Indian Sex Workers and the Law, 21 B C
THIRD WORLD L.J. 161 (2001); Kuna) Parker, "A Corporation ofSuperior Prostitutes": An
glo-Indian Conceptions of Temple Dancing Girls, 1800-1914, 32 MOD. ASIAN ST. 559 (1998);
Note, Interpreting Oriental Cases: The Law ofAlterity in the Colonial Courtroom, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1711 (1994). For important analyses of Orientalist understandings of law in the con
text of the Middle East, see Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The "Honor" of the
"East" and the "Passion" of the "West," 1997 UTAH L. REV. 287; Lama Abu-Odeh, Crimes
of Honour and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies, in FEMINISM & !SLAM: LEGAL
AND LITERARY PERSPECTIVES 141 (Mai Yamani ed., 1996); John Strawson, Islamic Law
and English Texts, 6 LAw & CRITIQUE 21 (1995); John Strawson, Reflections on
Edward Said and the Legal Narratives of Palestine: Israeli Settlements and Palestinian Self
Determination, 20 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV . 363 (2002). Furthermore, the fact that China as a
whole was never formally colonized by the West seems to have prevented the appreciation
of the many ways in which it was reduced to a de facto colonial status. See, e.g., SHU-MEI
SHIH, THE LURE OF THE MODERN: WRITING MODERNISM IN SEMICOLONIAL CHINA, 191737 (2001); Barlow, supra note 18. In any event, the applicability of postcolonial theory does
not depend solely on the precise degree to which a particular society has been colonized by a
Western state. In a larger sense, this body of theory is concerned with the historical construc
tion of the many different others against which the modern West defines itself. In so doing,
postcolonial theory need not assume a singular colonial/postcolonial trajectory for all "non
Western" societies. Rather, it is a useful technique for analyzing the different ways in which
the "non-West" has been produced and maintained in different places at different historical
moments.
.

.

63. Indeed, Said's Orientalism focuses on ideas of the Middle East that enjoy currency in
European literary works. While for Europeans "the Orient" connotes images of The Tales of
Arabian Nights, for Americans "the Orient" invokes East Asia, which gives ideas of China
greater prominence in American Orlentalisms. Since Said, studies of Orientalism have pro
liferated, and this Article represents one of its many elaborations - British, French, Asian
American, German, global, fe minist, postmodernist, etc. See, e.g., LISA LOWE, CRITICAL
TERRAINS: FRENCH AND BRITISH ORIENTALISMS (1991); SHENG-MEI MA, THE DEATHLY
EMBRACE: 0RIENTALISM AND ASIAN AMERICAN I DENTITY (2000); KAMAKSHI P. MURTI,
INDIA: THE SEDUCTIVE AND SEDUCED "OTHER" OF GERMAN 0RIENTALISM (2000);
BRYAN TURNER, 0RIENTALISM, GLOBALISM, POSTMODERNISM (1994); MEYDA
YEGENOGLU, COLONIAL FANTASIES: TOWARDS A FEMINIST READING OF ORIENTALISM
(1998).
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stereotypical views, of various degrees of influence, that one might
usefully analyze.
Second, the main focus here is on Western representations of
Chinese law. These representations tell us far more about the Western
idea, and ideology, of law than they do of any equivalent (or even
nonequivalent) phenomenon in China. Hence, this Article has very lit
tle to say of Chinese law in China, in terms of either indigenous legal
practices or indigenous representations of law. However, the solipsis
tic focus on Western representations of Chinese law is not meant to
imply that comparative law is in disciplinary bankruptcy and that
Chinese law cannot be known by Euro-American observers. Describ
ing Chinese law and comparing it to, say, American law remains an
important and viable - though difficult and always incomplete enterprise.64 Analyzing Chinese law from the perspective of postcolo
nial theory is not the terminus of the comparative enterprise, only its
starting point.65 Indeed, the project is perhaps best conceptualized as a
meta-theoretical approach to comparison, a study of how we look at
Chinese law and how those habits of perception in part constitute "us"
as "the West."
Third, the distinction here between law as a system of representa
tion and law as a material practice is only heuristic. As Robert Cover
succinctly observes, law is defined by both "word" and "violence," and
the two are intimately connected.66 The references in this Article to
64. In a seminal study of the barriers to knowing the Other, and especially the non-elite
Other ("subaltern," in the parlance of postcolonial studies), Gayatri Spivak poses the pro
vocative question, "Can the subaltern speak?" Her first, passionate reply was "No!" See
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988) [here
inafter Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?). In a subsequent revision of the essay, Spivak
characterizes her initial response as "inadvisable" and notes the importance of remaining
"upbeat" about the possibility of communicating with the subaltern, yet she cautions against
a naive identification of one's academic interpretation of the Other "with the 'speaking' of
the subaltern." GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL
REASON: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE VANISHING PRESENT 309 (1999) [hereinafter
SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON) ; see also GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY
SPIVAK, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography, in IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS
IN CULTURAL POLITICS 197, 205 (1987) (elaborating a practice of the "strategic use of posi
tivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest" in representing subaltern sub
jectivity) (hereinafter SPIVAK, Subaltern Studies]. On the methodological questions of "sub
alternity" in the context of the study of China, see Gail Hershatter, The Subaltern Talks
Back: Reflections on Subaltern Theory and Chinese History, 1 POSITIONS 103 (1993). On the
Marxist origins of the term "subaltern," see ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE
PRISON NOTEBOOKS 52-55 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans., 1971).
65. For a recent methodological inquiry into the next step, i.e., how one should go about
describing Chinese law, see Donald Clarke, Puzzling Observations About Chinese Law:
When ls a Riddle Just a Mistake? (unpublished working paper), at http://papers.ssrn.
comlso13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=293627 (last visited Oct. 24, 2002).
66. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). For a Marxist
analysis of the materiality of ideology and its embeddedness in material practices of the
state, see LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State A pparatuses (Notes Toward an
Investigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 85, 112 (Ben Brewster
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"Chinese law" and "Western" or "American law" should thus be read
as though they were in quotation marks, to emphasize that each is be
ing considered primarily as an idea and a cultural representation while still acknowledging that how we imagine ourselves through law
affects also how we act,67 and our actions in turn affect the material
conditions that support and give rise to legal representations and legal
ideologies.68
Fourth, neither Western nor Chinese law exists in isolation of the
other. How the West imagines China and Chinese law has colored its
encounters with Chinese legal ideology and legal practices. These en
counters in turn have further influenced - through interpretation and
misinterpretation - the status of China and Chinese law in Western
minds. Likewise, the Chinese have brought their own views of the
West to these encounters, and their understandings and misunder
standings of Western law have changed correspondingly. Indeed, since
the earliest Sino-European contacts, the Chinese too have used the
West for their own instrumental purposes, to confirm their own self
understandings of what it means to be Chinese. Moreover, American
and European observers do not have a monopoly on Orientalist un
derstandings of Chinese law. Today, the idea of Western superiority
enjoys global currency, and it has resulted in Chinese legal and cul
tural responses that can best be described as "self-Orientalism."69
Put simply, both Chinese and Western law exist in both Chinese
and Western imaginations and are intersubjectively linked.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos refers to this kind of legal intersubjectiv
ity aptly as "interlegality," which he defines as
not the legal pluralism of traditional legal anthropology, in which the dif
ferent legal orders are conceived as separate entities coexisting in the
same political space, but rather, the conception of different legal spaces
superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds, as much as in
our actions . . 70
.

trans., 2001) (1971) ("[A]n ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or prac
tices. This existence is material.").
67. Cf. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspec
tive, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167,
173 (1983) (describing law as "a distinctive manner of imagining the real").
68. For an urgent call for Western theorizers to keep in mind "Chinese reality," elusive
as it may be, see Zhang Longxi, Western Theory and Chinese Reality, 19 CRITICAL INQUIRY
105 (1992).
69. That is, the objects of Orientalist knowledge fulfill its prophecies by embracing it.
Cf. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 55, at 325 ("[T]he modern Orient, in short, participates
in its own Orientalizing.").
70. SANTOS, supra note 9, at 472-73 (1995). To be sure, like much of the literature
that takes globalization as its reference point, Santos envisions his "interlegality" as a largely
new, peculiarly postmodern form of legality, but the phenomenon is hardly new, although
it is perhaps more pronounced today. Compare, e.g., H. Patrick Glenn, North America
as a Medieval Legal Construction, 2 GLOBAL J URIST ADVANCES 1 (2002), at
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Thus, to the extent that we necessarily live our legal lives "in the inter
section of different legal orders,"71 even as systems of representation
Chinese and Western legal orders are not discrete.
Indeed, because of the interlegality of Chinese and Western law,
the baggage that Westerners have brought to their understandings of
Chinese law includes not only their "own" biases but often those of
the Chinese as well. That is, the rhetoric of China's official Confucian
ideology systematically privileged morality over law as a means of so
cial control, even while in practice the state relied on a sophisticated
legal system to govern the empire. However, in a process of
"Confucianization," the law eventually came to embody the values of
official Confucian morality, which in a sense allowed this Confucian
ized law to hide in plain sight.72 As William Alford points out, Euro
American scholars in tum have failed to appreciate the role of law in
China because of their tendency to take official Confucian pro
nouncements at face-value.73 In effect, Western legal Orientalism thus
reproduces some of the biases of the Confucian ideology.
Finally, I should acknowledge the implicit paradox in conceptual
izing my application of the analytic tools of postcolonial theory as an
intervention in the field of "comparative law." The discipline of com
parative law, as conventionally practiced, relies on a notion of the
world as a stable juridical formation consisting of naturalized nation
states, which is precisely the worldview that postcolonial theory con
tests, both descriptively and normatively. Yet as the above analysis
suggests and as sophisticated comparative lawyers know, "law can no
longer be thought of in exclusively national terms, and a clear distinc-

http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol2/issl/artl/ (likening the legal architecture of
post-NAFTA North America to that of medieval Europe, with jurisdictional relations that
are primarily "horizontal rather than vertical . . . provisional rather than definitive . . . and
contrapuntal rather than conflictual") with HAROLD BERMAN, LAw AND REVOLUTION:
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 10 (1983) ("[ P]erhaps the most dis
tinctive feature of the Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within the
same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems."). For an emphatic chal
lenge to the conventional view that China - and by implication, Chinese law - exist in
millennial isolation from the rest of the world, see JOANNA WALEY-COHEN, THE SEXTANTS
OF BEIJING: GLOBAL CURRENTS IN CHINESE HISTORY (1999). See also LIONEL M. JENSEN,
MANUFACTURING CONFUCIANISM: CHINESE TRADITIONS AND UNIVERSAL CIVILIZATION
(1997) (arguing that what we understand as "Confucianism" today is in fact a j oint
Sino-Western invention). For a recent analysis in comparative law of the intersubjectivity of
Latin American and European legal understandings, see Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of
Latin American Law (Part I), 1 997 UTAH L. REV. 425 (analyzing the representation of Latin
American law as "European" in the work of Rene David and suggesting that this "fiction" of
European-ness has been internalized by Latin American jurists).
71 . SANTOS, supra note 9.
72. For accounts of the Confucianization of Chinese law, see DERK BODDE &
CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1 967), and CH'O T'UNO-TSU, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1 961 )
73. See Alford, Law? What Law?, supra note 13, at 48.
.
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tion between national and foreign law can no longer be assumed. "74
Not only is the eroding distinction between domestic and foreign law
throwing into question the domestic-foreign comparison as the bed
rock of comparative law, but the blurring of categories
between law-making also at the national and international levels
brings even comparative and international lawyers into a shared,
global field of interlegality.75 That this Article takes comparative law
as its rhetorical point of entry for a postcolonial legal analysis is pri
marily an artifact of disciplinary distinctions. A similar intervention
could proceed through international law as well, with an analysis of
the legal construction of particularistic national identities and their
relationship to "universal" international norms, for example.76

74. Patrick Glenn, Harmonization of Law, Foreign Law and Private International Law,
1 E UR. REV. PRIVATE L. 47, 63 (1993).
75. Cf George Bermann, Comparative Law in the New European Community, 21
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 865, 869 (1 998) (observing the need for new comparative
methodologies "in an unaccustomed environment shaped by new international legal proc
esses") .
76. See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and In
ternational Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545. Postcolonial approaches seem to have
claimed a relatively larger presence in international law than comparative Jaw. Indeed, a
comprehensive bibliography is no longer possible within the confines of a footnote, but ex
amples in the field include ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000) ; Padideh
Ala'i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the
Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 877 (2000); Antony
Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century Interna
tional Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1 999); Antony Anghie, On the Indians Lately Discovered
and Sixteenth-Century International Law, 92 AM. Soc'Y lNT'L L. PROC. 374 (1998);
Nathaniel Berman, In the Wake of Empire, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1 521 (1 999); Lan Cao,
Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws,
90 CAL. L. REV. 401 (2002); Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005
(2001); Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the
Exotic Other Female, 26 N. ENG. L. REV. 1 509 (1992); James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism,
Colonialism and International Governance: Decentering The International Law of Govern
mental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996 (2000); James Thuo Gathii, International Law
and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 84 (1998); Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimiza
tion Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" Subject in /nternationaVPost-Colonial Feminist Legal
Politics, 1 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2002); Lydia Liu, Legislating the Universal: The Circula
tion of International Law in the Nineteenth Century, in TOKENS OF EXCHANGE: THE
PROBLEM OF TRANSLATION IN GLOBAL CIRCULATIONS 127 (Lydia H. Liu ed., 1999);
Tayyab Mahmud, Postcolonial Imaginaries: Alternative Development or A lternatives to De
velopment?, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (1999); Edward Said, Nationalism,
Human Rights, and Interpretation, in FREEDOM AND INTERPRETATION 1 75 (Barbara
Johnson ed., 1 992).
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LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE NATIONAL SUBJECT

Where it is anything but a fiction, the opposition traditionally established
between Orient and Occident is met nowhere more clearly than in the do
main of law.77
- Jean Escarra

The core of this Article is a comparative analysis of two legal sub
jects, the American and the Chinese.78 Yet it is hardly self-evident
what role - if any - the law plays in the formation of the nationally
and culturally marked subject. Section A first describes the so-called
constitutive view of law. Section B analyzes the ways in which the na
tional subject is produced in part through legal discourses.
A. Law as Constitutive
The West . . . is not to be found by recourse to a compass.79

- Harold J. Berman

Functionalist students of comparative law have a fairly thin view of
law and hence no account of the ways in which law participates in the
construction of our social worlds and, ultimately, of ourselves. Decon
structing the binary opposition that lawyers posit between "law" and
"society," Robert Gordon argues that law is in fact "omnipresent in
the very marrow of society," and law-making institutions are among
"the primary sources of pictures of order and disorder, virtue and vice,
reasonableness and craziness."80 Indeed, in Gordon's legal epistemol
ogy,
The power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the fo rce that it can
bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade
people that the world described in its images is the only attainable one in
which a sane person would want to live.81

This view that law is an inextricable part of the social world - often
dubbed the "constitutive" view of law - accords law much power, but
it is not the statist power of positive law.82 Law matters, even terribly,
77. JEAN ESCARRA, CHINESE LAW: CONCEPTION AND EVOLUTION, LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS, SCIENCE AND TEACHING 9 (Gertrude R. Browne trans., 1936).
78. See infra Part IV.
79. BERMAN, supra note 70, at 2.
80. Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 1 09 (1984).
81. Id.
82. For constitutive accounts of law, see, for example, PATRICIA EWICK, THE COMMON
PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1 998); FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH, supra note 55; ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A
CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW (1993); PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW
(1 999); PAUL KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE
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but not always in officially sanctioned ways, and it certainly does not
occupy a privileged place in the regulation of the world.83
Consider the difference between the constitutive and positivist
views of law in light of the Coase Theorem of law-and-economics, for
example. The theorem posits that even when parties do not resort to
courts, they bargain "in the shadow of the law" in the sense that they
take their legal entitlements as the baseline for negotiation.84 Chal
lenging this assumption, Robert Ellickson's ethnographic study of
California ranchers' dispute settlements provides examples of ranch
ers' imperfect knowledge of the law. According to Ellickson, the
ranchers believe, "almost as a proposition of natural law," that when a
highway collision involving livestock takes place in an open range
area, it is the owner of the livestock who "has the rights."85 In fact,
however, "[a)ll legal precedent on the issue indicates that the cattle
men's folklore on this subject is simply wrong."86
Ellickson's study provides a dose of much-needed skepticism to
ward "legal centralism," or the privileging of law as a form of social
control.87 Nevertheless, the fact that the ranchers get the law "wrong"
does not necessarily prove law's irrelevance, for ranchers' ideas of law
still shape the social landscape - even if the law is technically "misin
terpreted" or "misunderstood."88 According to Ellickson, the ranchers'
knowledge of the law of trespass is also incorrect, yet as one commen
tator puts it, legal "rights talk" on the range still has the power to tum
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997); LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Keams eds., 1993); and SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN:
LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1 990). For a theoretical
review of this literature, see Naomi Mezey, Out of the Ordinary: Law, Power, Culture, and
the Commonplace, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 145 (2001).
83. Indeed, law is not always and only constitutive, even if it has the capacity to be so
sometimes (even often); law can also fail. See Kitty Calavita, Blue Jeans, Rape, and the "De
Constitutive" Power of Law, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 89 (2001); cf. infra text accompanying
notes 114-116.
84. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); cf. Robert
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J 950 (1979).
.

85. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
82 (1991).
86. Id. at 88.
87. Id.
88. This focus on law's interpretation is not simply the legal realist distinction between
"law on books" and "law in action," with the latter privileged as (more) "real." Cf. Roscoe
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). Rather, the law matters
also in a third modality, that of "law in minds," to use William Ewald's apt phrase. William
Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1889, 2111 (1995). That is, beyond the dichotomy of law-as-written and law-as-enforced, it
also matters what people think the law is, how ordinary people understand it - however
"mistakenly." See also James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Mak
ing of Commerce, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1888 (1996) ("[W]e must know the work of learned
jurists - but we must read that work, at least some of the time, through Jay eyes.").
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"some incidents into 'trespass' and others into the 'realities of country
life.' "89
This interpretation turns the functionalist paradigm on its head:
rather than being a disinterested umpire helping settle disputes
brought before it, the law in fact creates them by giving them rhetori
cal form, such as "trespass."90 Without legal categories - however
"misunderstood" - to accommodate them, "incidents" among ranch
ers might not be incidents at all, but merely life, part of the undifferen
tiated raw material of social existence.91
Indeed, outside of comparative law critiques of functionalism have
a distinguished pedigree, and some of the oldest critiques emphasize
law's culturally productive power.92 The criminal trial, for example, is
89. Barbara Yngvesson, Beastly Neighbors: Continuing Relations in Cattle Country, 102
YALE L.J. 1787, 1 798 (1993). Needless to add, although accepting the social world as consti
tuted in legal categories restricts our choices by limiting our ability to imagine some (though
certainly not all) alternative social worlds, it does not deprive us of all agency. Laura Nader's
"user theory" of law, for example, emphasizes the ways in which resourceful plaintiffs can
manipulate the law to their own advantage. LAURA NADER, The Plaintiff A User Theory, in
THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS 168 (2002).
90. June Starr and Jane Collier wonder, "what is the anthropology of law if we doubt
that legal systems settle conflicts?" Starr & Collier, HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF
LAW, supra note 41, at 5. The response to their rhetorical question is that law does not sim
ply arise as an answer to problems emanating from society, as functionalists would claim.
Instead, law often serves "functions" that it creates for itself. For analyses of the social pro
ductivity of law, see, for example, MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note
56 (arguing that the main effect of modem penal institutions is the production, rather than
elimination, of criminality); MICHEL FOUCAULT, On Popular Justice: A Discussion with the
Maoists, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1 9721 977, at 35 (1 980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, On Popular Justice] ("[T]he bourgeois judicial
state apparatus, of which the visible, symbolic form is the court, has the basic function of in
troducing and augmenting contradictions among the masses."); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME ONE ( Robert Hurley trans., 1978) (arguing that sexuality
is �he effect of attempts to regulate and repress it); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory,
Production Theory, and Ideology in th(! Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 677 (1979)
(observing that legal liability rules always "inevitably affect tastes, which simply cannot be
treated as independent, ahistorical, private psychic events").
91 . As a more notorious illustration, consider the doctrine of standing. By requiring that
plaintiffs show "actual injury" and then designating some injuries as "actual" and others as
merely "ideological," the law again in effect produces injuries where none might have ex
isted before its intervention. Conversely, it also delegitimizes other "injuries," some of which
undoubtedly seemed perfe ctly "actual" to the injured themselves. See Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1 972) (denying standing to plaintiffs whose injuries are "ideological"). For a
theoretical analysis of "injury" as validating a claim to (legal) subjectivity, see WENDY
BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1 995).
92. Perhaps the most notable exception to the wide adoption of functionalism within the
discipline of comparative law is Alan Watson, who has been an ardent foe of functionalism
for decades. He does not, however, subscribe to the constitutive theory of law. On the con
trary, he views law as a system of technical rules that frequently make little or no difference
in the "real" world. According to Watson,
in the West the rules of private law have been and are in large measure out of step with the
needs and desires of society and even of its ruling elite; to an extent which renders implausi
ble the existing theories of legal development and of the relationship between law and
society.
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an utter failure if viewed functionally: "the rules of evidence are a
woefully inefficient tool of investigation, the definitions of criminal re
sponsibility rarely accord with sensible psychology, and the criminal
sentence often fails to serve any social purpose."93 In the words of the
legal realist Thurman Arnold, "[t]he only function which the criminal
trial can perform is to express currently held ideals about crime and
about trials." States Arnold,94
Obviously, therefore, the public administration of criminal justice is not a
method of controlling crime. It is rather one of the problems which must

be faced by those who desire to control crime. Without the drama of
criminal trial, it is difficult to imagine on just what institution we would

hang our conflicting ideals of public morality.95

In this view, law is primarily a text in which we inscribe our ideals. Its
"function," if indeed we are to impute a function to it, is expressing
who "we" are, or would like to imagine ourselves to be.96
B.

Law and Formation ofthe National Subject

To create a legal order is to write into law a sense of national unity and
purpose . rn
.

.

.

- June Starr & Jane Collier

The more different the cultural and historical context, the easier it
is to see the limits of functionalism. As an example of legal proceed
ings that hardly lend themselves to a functionalist analysis, consider
the practice in medieval Europe of prosecuting animals. Explaining in

ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE, at ix (1977). For a committed functionalist,
a truly dysfunctional law would be an oxymoron, while Watson insists on the contrary: "The
ability and readiness of society to tolerate inappropriate private law is truly remarkable." Id.;
see also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(1 974).
93. Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1149, 1168 (1997) (summarizing Thurman Arnold's view of the criminal trial).
94. THURMAN w. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 147-48 (1 935) (emphasis
added).
95. Id.
96. To be sure, Nietzsche, the great philosopher of anti-morality, claims the exact opposite - law reflects, not who we are, but who we are not:
It is a serious mistake to study the penal code of a people as if it gave expression to the na
tional character. The laws do not betray what a people are but rather what seems to them
foreign, strange, uncanny, outlandish. The laws refer to the exception to the morality of mo
res, and the severest penalties are provided for what accords with the mores of a neighboring
people.
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAy SCIENCE 109 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974) (1887). Yet
whether people identify with their laws or not - whether they provide a model or a kind of
anti-model against which to define oneself - in either event a purely functional analysis will
miss the point.
·

97. Starr & Collier, HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW, supra note 41 , at 11.
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a functionalist framework why the medieval French chose to try rats,
for example, would require considerable ingenuity. How would one
even begin to frame the inquiry? ("How did the French deal with the
problem of criminal rodents in the Middle Ages?" Or, "How did me
dieval French law address cross-species disputes?") A more culturally
specific analysis is surely required: What were the assumptions that
supported these trials? What makes them conceivable in certain places
at certain times, but not others?98 As historian Joseph Needham ob
serves, Chinese cultural assumptions, in contrast to those of medieval
Europe, provided little support to the idea of trying animals: "The
Chinese were not so presumptuous as to suppose that they knew the
laws laid down by God for non-human beings so well that they could
proceed to indict an animal at law for transgressing them."99
Observing connections between law and cultural practices is in fact
not new even to the comparative lawyer. From the Enlightenment un
til the arrival of functionalism and its promise of a neutral social scien
tific paradigm, such observations provided the main theoretical
grounding for comparative law. Put simply, in this view each nation
was defined by a unique cultural essence of which its laws were merely
a reflection. Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws is the locus classicus for this
culturalist mode of analysis: " [T]he political and civil laws of each na
tion . . . should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom
they are framed, that it is a great chance if those of one nation suit an
other. "100
To a contemporary observer, this is cultural essentialism pure and
simple, the cardinal sin of postmodern intellectual politics.101 Yet to
the extent that postcolonial theory criticizes the universalist preten
sions of functionalism and re-focuses our attention back on national
identity, do we risk simply returning to the earlier culturalist analyses
a la Montesquieu? Is postcolonialism just another case of taking one
98. Cf Ewald, supra note 88.
99. JOSEPH NEEDHAM, 2 SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA 51 8 (1 956); see also
ROBERT DARNTON, THE GREAT CAT MASSACRE 77 (1 984) (recounting a mock-trial of cats
in eighteenth-century Paris); Paul Schiff Berman, An Observation and a Strange but True
"Tale": What Might the Historical Trials ofAnimals Tell Us About the Transformative Poten
tial of Law in American Culture?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1 23 (2000 ).
100. 1 CHARLES SECONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, ch. 3 (1748).
A century later, Friedrich von Savigny analyzed the workings of the Volksgeist, "the spirit of
the people," which is a variation on a theme: "[l]t is the spirit of a people living and working
in common in all individuals, which gives birth to positive law, which therefore is to the con
sciousness of each individual not accidentally but necessarily one and the same." 1
FRIEDRICH VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 12 (William Holloway
trans., 1 867). For a discussion of Savigny and the so-called Historical School in Germany,
and their views of the complex relationship between the German Volksgeist and Roman Jaw,
see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA
(1 990).
101. Cf Annelise Riles, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the
Essentialization of Culture, 1 06 HARV. L. REV. 723 (1 993).
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step forward and two steps back? In fact, combining a postcolonial
analysis with the constitutive view of law radicalizes the received cul
turalist approach. For when the constitutive view is extended beyond
the law's role in the construction of our social worlds to include its role
in the construction of ourselves, as subjects, then law does not simply
mirror "our" pre-given national identity but enacts that identity.102
That is, the legal subject's consciousness is constituted in part by the
categories enshrined in law. Therefore, no subject stands outside the
law, and interpreting legal categories is not just something that we do
to law; in the process, law also aids - and limits - us in our process
of "self" -understanding.103
Today, there are many analyses of the discursive production of ra
cial, gender, and sexual identities, for example.104 Summarized crudely,
the insight most critical to comparative law is that our seemingly fixed,
real, and ontological selves are neither fixed nor ontologically stable,
but rather a complex of socially and historically contingent identities,
defined most notably by discourses of race, gender, and sexuality.
Those discourses consist partly of law, and, in this, law "subjects" us defines us in part as subjects.

102. That is, law is performative. "Performativity," popularized by Judith Butler's analy
sis of sex and gender, has become perhaps the most important postmodern analytic in under
standing how the discourses of race, gender, and sexuality constitute us as subjects. See gen
erally infra note 104. It is noteworthy that Butler draws expressly on Austin's theory of
"performative utterances," the key illustrations of which are legal statements. Law is perhaps
not only incidentally but paradigmatically performative. See generally J .L. AUSTIN, How TO
DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); J.L. AUSTIN, Performative Utterances, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 220 (1961).
103. In the words of Jan Haney Lopez, legal classifications of race both "legitimat[e] the
practice of categorization" and limit "the conceptions of who we are." IAN HANEY LOPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW 126 (1996); cf. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
255 (1987) ("[R]aces may be defined in America in some significant part by their relation
ship to antidiscrimination law in addition to constituting an independent influence on that
body of law.").
104. The literature is voluminous. As representative examples, consider the following.
In Butler's formulation, "gender is not a performance that a prior subject elects to do, but
gender is performative in the sense that it constitutes as an effect the very subject it appears
to express." Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Subordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAy THEORIES 24 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991); see also JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES
THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" (1993); J UDITH BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990). Perhaps the strongest
statement on the discursive production of "race" is that of Anthony Appiah: "[T)he truth is
that there are no races . . . . [Where race] works, it works as an attempt at metonym for cul
ture, and it does so only at the price of biologizing of what is culture, ideology." ANTHONY
APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE 45 (1992). On
the discursive construction of sexual orientation, see, for example, EVE KOSOFSKY
SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990), and MONIQUE WITTIG, THE
STRAIGHT MIND AND OTHER ESSAYS (1 992). Needless to add, by arguing that subjects are
constituted by performance/culture/discourse, none of the above theorists intends to suggest
that they are therefore somehow "not real." Indeed, insofar as "the real" is constituted by
them, performance/culture/discourse all have profound - often grievous - material impli
cations for their subjects.
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Indeed, some of the most important accounts of subject formation
emphasize how the social subject is produced through the language
and practices of the law. For Foucault, for example, law is an impor
tant discourse that creates the modern subject as its effect.105 The
French philosopher Louis Althusser similarly insists that the funda
mental achievement of legal ideology is the notion that "man is by na
ture a subject,"106 or, as he elaborates, law is one of the "rituals of in
dividual recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed
concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable
subjects."107 As an illustration of law's recognition of individuals as its
subjects, Althusser provides the notorious example of "the most
commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there! ' "108
He elaborates:
Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the
street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred

and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Be
cause he has recognized that the hail was 'really' addressed to him, and
that 'it was really him who was hailed' ( and not someone else ) . Experi
ence shows that the practical telecommunication of hailings is such that

105. To be sure, law is only one discourse, i n the Foucaultian sense, among many. From
a broader perspective, Foucault's reuvre is a study of the ways in which human beings have
become subjects of various modem discourses, such as law, medicine and science. As
Foucault observes in Discipline and Punish, the "soul," or subjectivity, that we believe to
inhabit the body, is in fact "the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the
prison of the body." FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 55, at 30. While I read
Foucault's history of the emergence of modem penal institutions as a legal analysis, Foucault
himself frequently adopts a narrower, positivist conception of law where law seems to consti
tute little more than the express command (or, more frequently, prohibition) of the sover
eign. As Duncan Kennedy observes, Foucault typically opposes this narrowly operating "ju
ridical power" to "disciplinary power," viewing juridical power as " 'only the technical form'
or 'crystallization' of processes of power that take place at a distance from legal institutions."
DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY DRESSING ETC. 83,
120 (1993); see also Hugh Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 48
STAN. L. REV. 449 (1 996) (noting Foucault's tendency toward legal positivism). Indeed, in
an interview on the possibility of popular Maoist justice, for example, Foucault reduces law
to "the bourgeois judicial state apparatus." FOUCAULT, On Popular Justice, supra note 90.
From the perspective of Foucault's larger enterprise, however, it seems more accurate to
view law as one of several modem disciplinary discourses rather than merely the express
command of the state. For a deployment of such a Foucaultian understanding of law, see
Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 431 (1 992).
106. ALTHUSSER, supra note 66, at 1 15 n.15. In Althusser's view, the seeming obvious
ness the "you and I are subjects" is the very effect of ideology, so that the notion of an
"ideological subject" is itself "a tautological proposition." ld. at 116. Turning "concrete indi
viduals" into subjects is what ideology does. By comparing Foucault's "discourse" to
Althusser's "ideology," I am not implying an identity between the two concepts. Indeed,
Foucault intends his notion of "discourse" to complicate a simple Marxist dichotomy be
tween the material base and ideology. Elaborating the theoretical relationship between dis
course and ideology - though a productive enterprise - is far beyond the scope of this
Article.
107. Id. at 117.
108.

Id . at 1 18.
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they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed al

ways recognizes that it is really him who is being hailed.109

In this scene, the subject is occasioned "through language, as the
effect of the authoritative voice that hails the individual."110 While law
is not the only means of "hailing,"111 it provides a paradigmatic exam
ple of a modern apparatus of "subjection."112 Of course, the scene of a
policeman hailing a pedestrian in the street is ultimately allegorical. A
"concrete individual" does not, one day, magically turn into a "sub
ject" upon an accidental encounter with a policeman in the street.
Rather, everyone is "always-already a subject, appointed as a subject
in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which [he or
she] is 'expected' once [he or she] has been conceived."113 Even before
we are born, the law is waiting for us, with birth certificates as well as
sets of social security numbers ready to go the moment we enter the
world - not to mention family law and the kinship structures it de
fines for us.

109. Id.
110. JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 5
(1997).
111. Althusser refers to the process of subject-formation also as both "interpellation"
and "hailing." Kaja Silverman distinguishes between them by viewing the former as an out·
come and the latter as the form of address whereby the outcome is achieved. See KAJA
SILVERMAN, THE SUBJECT OF SEMIOTICS 48 (1983). As Silverman puts it evocatively,
"[i]nterpellation occurs when the person to whom the agent speaks recognizes him or herself
in that speech and takes up subjective residence there." Id. at 49.
112. Althusser is acutely aware of "the ambiguity of the term subject," meaning both "a
free subjectivity . . . responsible for its actions" as well as "a subjected being, who submits to
a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom." ALTHUSSER, supra note 66, at
123. Paradoxically, law can make us "free" only if we submit to it.
In Althusser's example, the law hails the individual from above, in the authoritative
voice of a policeman. While Althusser does not contemplate the possibility that law ema
nates from many directions, it is possible, as Janet Halley observes, for law to interpellate us
- and thus subject us, in both relevant senses - "from below" as well: in the hands of ac
tivists who advocate legally on behalf of identity-based groups such as gays and lesbians,
"identity can be deployed to harm its own subjects." See Janet Halley, Gay Rights and Iden
tity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 140 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
Just as Foucault recognizes the multiplicity of overlapping discourses - from the juridi
cal to the medical to the religious - so Althusser too notes the existence of several "ideo
logical state apparatuses," of which law is only one. It is noteworthy, however, that law is
one of the two main examples of interpellation he provides. His other chief example is that
of religious ideology and interpellation through the divine voice of God. ALTHUSSER, supra
note 66, at 120-24. Indeed, there are several analyses of the emergence of modern "rule of
law" as the establishment of a kind of �ecular religion. See Sanford Levinson, " The Constitu
tion" in American Civil Religion, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 123, 151 (Philip Kurland
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1979); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scriptllre, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1984); Jonathan Macey, Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in the
American Law School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1937, 1938 (1993) (observing tendency to view the
legal profession as a quasi-religious "calling").
113. ALTHUSSER, supra note 66, at 119.
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Of course, however social subjects are produced - legally or oth
erwise - they are never fully achieved. For one thing, we are all sub
jects of many discourses, or multiply interpellated.1 14 The criminal is
perhaps the clearest example of a (partially) failed legal interpellation,
a subject who has not internalized all of law's interdictions. Yet no
criminal can - or would even want to - flout all laws, as law is simply
so pervasive in our social worlds that it can be violated only at chosen
points at chosen times; to exist in complete, continuous violation of all
law would be to be mad. Consider also Holmes's notoriously amoral
"bad man."115 He is no criminal, nor is he insane, but his instrumental
approach to Jaw ("How much can I get away with?") certainly mani
fests a fractured legal subjectivity, a configuration where homo juridi
cus meets h omo economicus. Being a legal subject does not imply be
ing a perfect legal subject or being only law's subject. 1 1 6
If we accept that law defines in part who and what we are as sub
jects, then laws are part of a people's identity as a people. It is a com
monplace of postcolonial theory that "nations" and "peoples" do not
exist as inert facts of nature any more than our ostensibly individual
selves do; nations are, in Benedict Anderson's evocative conceptuali
zation, "imagined communities." 1 1 7 If anything, China is even more of
an imagined community than most other nations. For the greater part
of its history, China has in fact not existed as a unified country, yet
even during extensive periods of disunity the notion of a single China
has persisted as a historical and cultural ideal demanding to be real
ized.118 We should thus expect that legal discourses have played a role
in the process of creating and maintaining the identity of the norma
tive universe known as "China. "1 19
1 14. Norma Alarcon, The Theoretical Subject(s) of "This Bridge Called My Back" and
Anglo-American Feminism, in MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL: HACIENDO CARAS 356 (Glo
ria Anzaldua ed., 1990).
115. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1 897).
116. This, in turn, is only a corollary of the general poststructuralist observation that
subjects are never complete.
1 1 7. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS OF THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1 983).
118. MARK ELVIN, THE PATTERN OF THE CHINESE PAST (1973); ANDREW L. MARCH,
THE IDEA OF CHINA: MYTH AND THEORY IN GEOGRAPHIC THOUGHT 118 (1974) (analyz
ing the "parts of fact, theory and myth that go into ideas about China"). For a study of the
emergence of modern Chinese nationalism written from a postcolonial perspective, see
PRASENJIT DUARA, RESCUING HISTORY FROM THE NATION: QUESTIONING NARRATIVES
OF MODERN CHINA (1 995).
119. Of course, legal subjects are not the products merely of domestic laws, but also of
international law, which indeed demands cultural differentiation among "nations." As
Nathaniel Berman observes, "groups' identities and tactics come to be defined by them
selves and by international authorities in response to a cultural conjecture partly constructed
by [the] categories [of international law]." Nathaniel Berman, The International Law of
Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal History, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC
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But before trying to understand Chinese legal understandings of
"China," the first analytic move should be to consider how we imagine
ourselves legally, and how those conceptions draw support from par
ticular notions of Chinese law.
IV. LEGAL SUBJECTS OF ORIENTALISM

The education of colonial subjects complements their production in law.120
-

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Structurally, Orientalism as a discourse entails the projection onto
the Oriental Other of various sorts of things that "we" are not. Given
law's role in the constitution of subjects and national "imagined com
munities," how do Americans imagine themselves as legal subjects?
How does the American legal subject (Section A) differ from the
Chinese legal subject (Section B)? A fully contextualized genealogy of
legal Orientalism is hardly possible within the confines of a single arti
cle. What follows is a sketch of the broad outlines of one possible ge
nealogy, focusing on the ways in which legal subjectivity has consti
tuted a standard for measuring non-Western societies' - here,
China's - civilizational fitness to enter into "law's republic."121
A. American Legal Subject
Americans are a very legal people indeed, to the point that to say
so is a clicM. In the words of Alexis de Tocqueville, Americans "bor
row, in their daily controversies, the ideas and even the language, pe
culiar to judicial proceedihgs."122 As the French observer concluded,
"Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."123 This is perhaps
not very surprising when one considers that America's foundational
myths are also peculiarly legal.
As a political idea, the United States embodies the ambitions of
the Enlightenment, which also gave birth to "modern" law: the first
French civil code, the first Declaration of the Rights of Man and, fi
nally, the United States Constitution - the closest thing to a people's
effort to negotiate a real-life "social contract." Even ordinary
Americans' faith in law's redemptive power often rivals that of the
Enlightenment philosophes. Perhaps the most extraordinary example
CONFLICT 29 (David Wippman ed., 1998). In Santos's terms, this is an instance of "interle
gality" of identity. Cf text accompanying notes 70-71.
120. Spivak, Can rhe Subaltern Speak?, supra note 64, at 282.
121. Cf Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493 (1988).
122. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Vintage Classics
1990) (1835).
123. Id.
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of such faith is Frederick Douglass: faced with a "state legal order no
more likely to hold slavery unconstitutional than to declare the immi
nent kingship of Jesus Christ on earth,"124 a man born as a slave in
antebellum America nevertheless believed in the ultimate unconstitu
tionality of slavery.125
To an outsider today, it is almost equally remarkable to observe
how Americans habitually invoke their constitutional rights. That they
do so in apparently trivial contexts makes it only more remarkable.
"You can't do that to me; it's unconstitutional," ordinary people pro
test in varied everyday situations, whether they are being bumped off
an overbooked flight or overcharged for a purchase. The Constitution
and the rights it guarantees - in the popular imagination if not in the
courtroom - are simply part of what it means to identify as an
American.126
As a powerful historical example of Americans' attachment to law,
consider the clash of legal traditions in Mexican California prior to its
annexation to the United States in 1846. Anglo-American expatriate
traders were dismayed at the Mexican legal institutions which they
deemed inadequate for the purposes of contract enforcement.127 Para
doxically, in their dealings among themselves the traders nevertheless
continued using fastidiously drafted "legal" contracts {based on lay
men's recollections) even when there was no prospect of their en
forcement.128 What was the point of going through such quasi-legal
motions? David Langum suggests an answer in the Anglo-American
expatriates' shared mercantile culture:
124. Cover, supra note 66, at 39.
125. In Douglass's own words,
I was conducted to the conclusion that the Constitution of the United States - inaugurated
to "form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty" - could
not well have been designed at the same time to maintain and perpetuate a system of rapine
and murder-like slavery, especially as not one word can be found in the Constitution to
authorize such a belief.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 261 -62 {R. Logan
ed., 1967). Indeed, Douglass's identification with law has in turn become part of American
cultural identity. See PRISCILLA C. WALD, Neither Citizen Nor Alien: National Narratives,
Frederick Douglass, and the Politics of Self-Definition, in CONSTITUTING AMERICANS:
CULTURAL ANXIETY AND NARRATIVE FORM 14 {1995) (analyzing a series of nineteenth
century Supreme Court cases together with Douglass's autobiography as constitutive of
American identity).
126. In Lawrence Friedman's phrase, Americans have increasingly come to expect from
law "total justice." See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1994). On the increas
ing insistence on legal rights, see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991 ).
127. DAVID J. LANGUM, LAW AND COMMUNITY ON THE MEXICAN CALIFORNIA
FRONTIER: ANGLO-AMERICAN EXPATRIATES AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS.
1 821-1846, at 163-186 (1987).
128. Id.
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T o a significant extent that culture included law. It was for that reason
that in the face of potential breakdown of contractual relations, these

men could make technical legal claims on one another, claims of which
they had no subjective hope of enforcement in the local courts, but with
every hope that they could convince their opponent of the rightfulness of
their positions.129

De Tocqueville could hardly have asked for a better example of
Americans who "borrow, in their daily controversies, the ideas and
even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings."130 Apparently un
able to imagine commercial exchange apart from "contract," even in
an extralegal setting these expatriate traders continued to conceptual
ize their commercial relations in Anglo-American legal terms. As an
inseparable part of their conceptual apparatus, they carried "law" in
their heads even into the alien territory of Mexican California.131
To be sure, most Americans' relationship to law is deeply ambiva
lent. A strong attachment to law - one observer diagnoses this condi
tion as "hyperlexis"132 - alternates with a fear of law. (Recall, for ex
ample, Learned Hand's terror at the prospect of being dragged to
court: "As a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything
short of sickness and death."133) Yet whether they view law as the
promise of a better society or as vexatious litigation, or both,

129. Id. at 186.
130. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 122, at 280.
131. The expatriate traders were exceedingly self-conscious as well as self-righteous
about how their attachment to law set them apart from, and above, the native Californios.
The fact that alcaldes, the local Mexican officials roughly analogous to justices of the peace,
performed a combination of judicial as well as administrative functions occasioned
American cries of the violation of separation of powers. LANGUM, supra note 127, at 51.
Similarly, the Mexican preference for conciliation over adjudication offended a growing
Anglo-American emphasis on the need for judicial predictability and certainty as part of the
legal infrastructure of capitalism. That this clash of legal values implicated deeply
Americans' identity qua Americans is evident from the contemporaneous debate over pro
posals to create American "conciliation courts." In New York, such a proposal was met with
the summary objection that "such courts belonged only to a despotic government, where the
people were ignorant, and a superior class over them, and not for our free Yankee popula
tion; who consider they are competent to judge for themselves in such matters." W. BISHOP
& W. ATIREE, REPORT ON THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR
THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 58 (1846), quoted in
LANGUM, supra note 127, at 143. Asked to consider conciliation as a mandatory procedure,
the California Supreme Court in 1850 noted in similarly supercilious language that while
conciliation was perhaps suitable for Mexicans, "amongst the American people it can be
looked upon in no other light than as a useless and dilatory formality." Von Schmidt v.
Huntington, 1 CAL. 55, 65 (1 850). Ironically, today "alternative dispute resolution" repre
sents, not backwardness, but the cutting edge of legal reform.
132. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4, 64 (1983) (contrasting elites' counterfactual perceptions of excessive liti
gation with empirical data and analyzing "elite ways of interpreting these phenomena").
133. 3 LEARNED HAND, Deficiencies of Trial to Reach the Truth of the Matter, in
LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS (1921-22), at 89, 105 (James N. Rosenburg et al. eds., 1926).
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Americans' identification with law remains extraordinarily strong.134
Numerous ethnographies describe American communities where the
actual behavioral norm is the avoidance of formal law.135 Yet, as Carol
Greenhouse observes, even in the face of evidence to the contrary,
"many Americans are ready to believe, almost to the point of insis
tence, in their own allegedly litigious character."136
B.

Chinese Non-Legal Non-Subject

With the Chinese law . . . we are carried back to a position whence we can
survey, so to speak, a living past, and converse with fossil men. 137
- Edward Harper Parker

If such is the self-understanding of the American legal subject, how
do Orientalist discourses perceive the Chinese legal subject? Legal
Orientalisms come in many varieties, such as classical European
Orientalism described in Section 1 below and the American anti
immigration Orientalism of Section 2. Indeed, Orientalist views of

134. Or, in Duncan Kennedy's formulation, American legal thought generally displays
"an odd combination of utter faith and utter distrust in law." DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE 73 (1997).
135. See, e.g., M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF A SUBURB 127-28 (1988)
("The evidence from the suburbs suggests . . . that the penetration of law into American life
has been considerably more limited in its range and effect than is commonly believed.");
ELLICKSON, supra note 85.
136. Carol J. Greenhouse, Interpreting American Litigiousness, in HISTORY AND POWER
IN THE STUDY OF LAW, supra note 41 , at 252. The point is ultimately not an empirical one
about Americans' actual litigiousness. Rather, it is a claim about law's role in cultural repre
sentation and self-understanding. ln the legal academy in particular, writers who question
the role of law in causing social change are often angrily dismissed. When Gerald Rosenberg
and Michael Klarman argued that Brown v. Board of Education had only a limited real
world effect on school segregation, the claim was met with immediate denunciations. Com
pare GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991) and Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights Move
ment, 80 VA. L. Rev. 7 (1994) with David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist
Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. Rev. 151 (1994); see also RICHARD
ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, 19801994, at 523 (1995) ("The centrality of law in the American labor, civil rights, feminist, wel
fare rights, consumer, environmentalist, and gay rights movements can tempt observers to
parochial and ahistorical exaggerations of its capacity to effect social change.").
Legal elites' attachment to law is of course understandable in that it confirms their own
significance. In this light, the extent to which "law" constitutes an important dimension of
American national identity may well depend in part on one's social location. Reva Siegel, for
example, observes that although the judicially eviscerated Equal Protection Clause no longer
protects, "[i]n this area of constitutional law, the nation articulates its identity aspiration
ally." Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. Rev. 1111, 1 146 (1 997). Notions of equal protection are
certainly part of American-ness, but it is perhaps the classes that can afford to live without
judicial protection that also most strongly identify with an Equal Protection Clause that does
not in fact protect, as Siegel pointedly observes.
137. Edward Harper Parker, Comparative Chinese Family Law, 8 CHINA REV. 67, 69
(1879).
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China can be both negative and positive, as illustrated in Section 3.
However, what the many Orientalisms described below share is a ten
dency to posit the Chinese as non-legal and lacking in subjectivity effectively non-legal non-subjects.
1.

European Legal Orienta/ism

"Europe" remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, in
cluding the ones we call "Indian, " "Chinese, " "Kenyan, " and so on. 138
- Dipesh Chakrabarty

I begin the account of Chinese legal subjectivity, or its absence, by
outlining Hegel's vision of China in his Philosophy of History. I do so
without any implication that Hegel "invented" Orientalism or is
somehow singularly responsible for it. Uninterested in either accusing
or excusing its author,139 I use the Philosophy of History simply as a
textual case study, for it happens to provide a truly classic statement of
many Orientalist ideas that continue to structure the perception of
Chinese law even today.
According to Hegel, "The history of the world travels from East to
West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the begin
ning."140 In Hegel's dual ontology, Oriental states "belong to mere
space," or "un-Historical History," while the West exists in the "Form
of time."141 According to Hegel,
With the Empire of China History has to begin, for it is the oldest, as far
as history gives us any information, and its principle has such substantial
ity, that for the empire in question it is at once the oldest and the newest.
Early do we see China advancing to the condition in which it is fo und at
this day, for as the contrast between objective existence and subjective
freedom of movement within it, is still wanting, every change is excluded,

and the fixedness of character which recurs perpetually takes the place of
what we should call the truly historical.142

Hegel's statement of China's extraordinary stability is no doubt ex
treme, yet it has many historical variations.143 In Marx's scathing
138. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 3 1 , at 27.
1 39. Cf SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON, supra note 64, at 97-98
(elaborating a deconstructionist politics of reading whose "challenge is not to excuse, but to
suspend accusation to examine with painstaking care if the protocols of the text contain a
moment that can produce something that will generate a new and useful reading").
140. GEORG WILHELM HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 103 (J. Sibree trans.,
1956).
141. Id. at 105-06.
142. Id. at 116.
143. The view of China as existing in space but not in time finds a place even in
Foucault. Borges's "Chinese encyclopaedia" leads Foucault to find a curiously atemporal
culture "at the other extremity of the earth we inhabit, a culture devoted entirely to the or
dering of space, but one that does not distribute the multiplicity of existing things into any of
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metaphor, China "vegetates in the teeth of time,"144 while Weber saw
in Confucianism a religion that worshipped the status quo and thus
radically impeded China's passage into modernity.145
In Hegel's particular teleological view, History's end goal is the ac
complishment of freedom, which coincidentally culminates in the po
litical system of Prussia. In contrast, China, standing at the threshold
of History, is the paradigmatic example of "Oriental Despotism."
Despotism is in fact the natural form of government for the Chinese,
for the simple reason that they do not exist as individual subjects. In
Hegel's words, in China "all that we call subjectivity is concentrated in
the supreme Head of the State,"146 while "individuals remain mere ac
cidents."147 This despotism results in part from a confusion between
family and state: "The Chinese regard themselves as belonging to the
family, and at the same as children of the state."148 By implication, the
Chinese also lack a proper distinction between law and morality:
moral dicta are expressed in the form of laws, but lacking subjectivity,
the Chinese obey these laws merely as external forces, like children
who fear parental punishment.149
Analyzed as an Orientalist discourse, Hegel's account accom
plishes several things. First, the purported fact that China is timeless
and static implies that the West is not.150 Second, imputing to the
the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and think." FOUCAULT, THE
ORDER OF THINGS, supra note 2, at xix.
144. KARL MARX ON COLONIALISM AND MODERNIZATION 323 (Shlomo Avineri ed.,
1968); see also MARX ON CHINA, 1853-1860: ARTICLES FROM THE NEW YORK DAILY
TRIBUNE (Dona Torr ed., 1951). For an elaboration of the theoretical place of China in
Marx's thought, see DONALD M. LOWE, THE FUNCTION OF "CHINA" IN MARX, LENIN, AND
MA0 (1 966) .
145. Weber, in particular, defines China in relentlessly negative terms, by what it is not.
He attributes China's "failure" to develop a rational bourgeois capitalism to the "absence"
of a dynamic religious ethic of the Protestant variety: "Chinese intellectual life remained
completely static, and despite seemingly favorable conditions modern capitalism simply did
not appear." WEBER, supra note 17' at 55; cf MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 1992). While Weber has many fascinat
ing local insights into Chinese law, his global view suffers from the essentially negative na
ture of his general approach. See generally Gary G. Hamilton, Why No Capitalism in China?
Negative Questions in Historical Comparative Research, 1 J. DEVELOPING SOCIETIES 187
(1985).
146. HEGEL, supra note 140, at 113.
1 47. Id. at 105. For a twentieth-century version of the enduring idea of Oriental Des
potism, updated for the needs of the Cold War, see KARL A. WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL
DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957).
148. HEGEL, supra note 140, at 121.
1 49. Id. at 111 ("Moral distinctions and requirements are expressed as Laws, but so that
the subjective will is governed by these Laws as by an external force.").
150. The Orientalist emphasis on China's static nature is indeed a key component of
China's negative definition; while the West is dynamic, changing, and progressive, China is
forever stagnant. Most understandings of China, whether damning or praising, operate on
the assumption of Chinese "immobilism," to borrow Derrida's term. See JACQUES
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Chinese a lack of subjectivity and moral character suggests that
Westerners do not lack those progressive qualities. Third, observing
that the Chinese are confused about the real nature of "law" estab
lishes the European legal ordering as proper. The Orientalist implica
tions are not difficult to grasp: China is an anti-model and stands for
everything that we would not wish to be - or admit to being. This is
an entirely negative definition: China is basically just a "glimpse of
what it itself is not," viz., we, the Occident.151
2.

American Legal Orienta/ism

Hegel, Marx, and Weber are classical European Orientalists whose
work ultimately affirms the superiority of Western civilization and
law.152 However, they do not exhaust the universe of legal
Orientalisms, which vary by historical and cultural context. The antiDERRIDA, The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology, in MARGINS OF
PHILOSOPHY 69 (Alan Bass trans., 1982) [hereinafter DERRIDA, The Pit and the Pyramid).
Frozen in time, China never changes. And even if it does - well, plus fa change, plus c'est la
meme chose. The fact that China has gone through devastating revolutions, catastrophic
famines, bloody rebellions, and violent dynastic transitions, and the like, ultimately fits into a
predictable cycle of quasi-Nietzschean eternal recurrence. Consider, for example, Edward
Parker's rather oxymoronic complaint that "Chinese legal changes" constitute a "monoto
nous history." Edward H. Parker, The Principles of Chinese Law and Equity, 22 LAW Q.
REV. 190, 209 (1906). The notion of a changeless China is of course a fiction, for, as the his
torian Paul Cohen notes, "all societies undergo change all the time." COHEN, D ISCOVERING
HISTORY, supra note 39, at 6. However, "the degree to which such change is deemed signifi
cant, is 'noticed,' is ultimately a relative matter, dependent upon what a particular historian
living in a particular society at a particular time happens to regard as important." Id. As
Cohen concludes, "because Westerners on the whole and Americans in particular happen to
place a high cultural valuation on change, or at least certain forms of it, the vision of a non
changing or trivially changing China is implicitly condescending." Id. For an important cor
rection to Weber's version of the changeless-China thesis, see THOMAS A. METZGER,
ESCAPE FROM PREDICAMENT : NEO-CONFUCIANISM AND CHINA'S EVOLVING POLITICAL
CULTURE (1977).
151. HAUN SAUSSY, Hegel's Chinese Imagination, in THE PROBLEM OF A CHINESE
AESTHETIC 161 (1993).
152. To be sure, in Marx's case even the modern Western legal civilization may ulti
mately be destined to wither away together with the state, but as the penultimate way station
to Utopia it certainly represents a higher stage in the development of historical materialism
than the despotic law of Oriental civilizations. As Marx states unequivocally, colonial rule in
Asia had a dual mission, "one destructive, the other regenerating - the annihilation of old
Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia." Karl
Marx, The Future Results of British Rule in India, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 659, 659
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). Again, wishing to neither accuse nor excuse the three
thinkers considered here, cf supra note 139, I am evaluating their work along only one nar
row dimension: what their work has to say about China and its relation to the West. That is,
I am not seeking to shame them in an act of "postcolonial revenge" (to borrow Leela Gan
dhi's stark phrase) but simply examining them as historical artifacts. See LEELA GANDHI,
POSTCOLONIAL THEORY, at x (1998). Or, as Said might put it, I am viewing Orientalist texts
as part of the worlds in which they existed, since texts, "even when they appear to deny it . . .
are nevertheless part of the social world, human life, and of course the historical moments in
which they are located and interpreted." EDWARD SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT, AND THE
CRITIC 4 (1983).
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immigrant Orientalism of nineteenth-century United States provides
an example of a peculiarly American form of Orientalism.153 As one
historian of Chinese immigration observes, nineteenth-century
Americans viewed almost every aspect of Chinese life as an illustra
tion of their backwardness: "wearing white for mourning, purchasing a
coffin while still alive, dressing women in pants and men in skirts,
shaking hands with oneself in greeting a friend, writing up and down
the page, eating sweets first and soup last, etc."154
The usefulness of this particular Orientalist discourse lay in its role
in justifying the legal exclusion of Chinese immigrants at that histori
cal moment. Indeed, the text of a 1878 report by the California State
Senate Committee on Chinese Immigration sounds as though it had
been excerpted directly from Hegel's Philosophy of History:
The Chinese are . . . able to underbid the whites in every kind of labor.
They can be hired in masses; they can be managed and controlled like

unthinking slaves. But our laborer has an individual life, cannot be con
trolled as a slave by brutal masters, and this individuality has been re
quired by the genius of our institutions, and upon these elements of
character the State depends for defense and growth.155

Such sentiments may have very much a nineteenth-century flavor,
but consider also the following analysis of the Chinese immigration
exclusion, made by a federal judge in the 1920s:
The yellow or brown racial color is the hall-mark of Oriental despotisms,
or was at the time the original naturalization law was enacted. It was
deemed that the subjects of these despotisms, with their fixed and in

grained pride in the type of their civilization, which works for its welfare
by subordinating the individual to the personal authority of the sover
eign, as the embodiment of the state, were not fitted and suited to make

1 53. See generally Keith Aoki, "Foreign-ness" and Asian American Identities, 4 UCLA
ASIAN PAC. AM. L. J. l, 7-44 (1996) (describing the history of "American Orientalism"); Neil
Gotanda, Exclusion and Inclusion: Immigration and Amerimn Orienta/ism, in ACROSS THE
PACIFIC: ASIAN AMERICANS AND GLOBALIZATION 1 29 (Evelyn Hu-DeHart ed., 1999); see
also LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 1-36
(1996).
154. STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT: THE AMERICAN
IMAGE OF THE CHINESE 1785-1885, at 27-28 (1969).
155. State of California, Senate Special Committee on Chinese Immigration, quoted in
TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE H ISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE
SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA 1 74 (1994). These conclusions were foreshadowed by a joint
special committee of the U.S. Congress: "To admit these vast numbers of aliens to citizen
ship and the ballot would practically destroy republican institutions on the Pacific coast, for
the Chinese have no comprehension of any form of government but despotism, and have not
the words in their own language to describe intelligibly the principles of our representative
system." Report of Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration, S. REP.
NO. 689, 44th Cong., 2nd Sess. ( 1 877), quoted in Leti Volpp, "Obnoxious to Their Very Na
ture": Asian Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 5 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 57, 63 (2001 )
.
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for the success of a republican fo rm of Government. Hence they were
denied citizenship.156

To the judge, it was thus self-evident that the Congress's exclusion of
the Chinese from immigration was not based on "color" but cultural
disqualification for citizenship.157 That is, the Chinese were so radically
"un-legal" that they were simply not capable of the kind of self
governance that was required by America's "republican form of
Government."
3.

Positive and Negative Orienta/isms: Rationality and Chinese Law

Terms chosen for the Chinese formed strange oxymorons, so that the
Chinese were "deceitful" and "absolutely trustworthy" in the same sen
tence.158
- Stuart Creighton Miller

Jn its administration the government of China is despotic and demo
cratic. 159
- Thomas R. Jernigan

Bleak as many characterizations of China and the Chinese are,
Orientalist discourses by no means need always be relentlessly nega
tive.160 Quite the contrary, there are many instances of fervid idealiza
tion of the Chinese. Jacques Derrida refers to China as a "sort of
European hallucination" which represents different things to different
observers.161 In an effortless volte-face, Nietzsche, for example, is able
to use China as a negative example for Europeans on one page, and

156. Terrace
(1923).

v.

Thompson, 274 F. 841, 849 (W.D. Wash. 1921), affd, 263 U.S. 197

157. Id. ("It is obvious that the objection on the part of Congress is not due to color, as
color, but only to color as an evidence of a type of civilization which it characterizes.") (em
phasis added).
158. MILLER, supra note 154, at 1 0 (describing a study of American racial stereotypes of
the Chinese).
159. THOMAS R. JERNIGAN, CHINA IN LAW AND COMMERCE, at v (1905).
160. Moreover, as Homi Bhabha emphasizes, even the seemingly most negative stereo
types are ultimately ambivalent and open to resignification. See generally HOMI K. BHABHA,
Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of .Colonial Discourse, in THE LOCATION
OF CULTURE 85 (1994). Insofar as Orientalist discourses are always overdetermined, the
subject positions they produce are also never stable - either for the Oriental Other or the
Western observer. As Bhabha explains, "Stereotyping is not the setting up of a false image
which becomes the scapegoat of discriminatory practices. It is a much more ambivalent text
of projection and introjection, metaphoric and metonymic strategies, displacement, overde
termination, guilt, aggressivity; the masking and splitting of 'official' and phantasmatic
knowledges . . . " HOM! BHABHA, The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination and the
Discourse of Colonialism, in THE LOCATION OF CULTURE, supra, at 66, 8 1 -82.
.

161. JACQUES DERRIDA, Of Grammatology as a Positive Science, in OF
GRAMMATOLOGY 74, 80 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976) [hereinafter DERRIDA,
OF GRAMMATOLOGY).
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then as a model only a few pages later.162 Instead of being simply "a
dull half-conscious brooding spirit" in the darkness, as Hegel describes
China,163 for the French philosophes, China is a source of
Enlightenment: ex Oriente Lux - and even lex. An ardent Sinophile,
Voltaire, for example, marvels at the religious tolerance of the
Chinese bureaucratic state.164 Similarly, reports by sixteenth-century
Jesuit missionaries to China extol Chinese criminal justice "which
these Gentiles have great care to performe."165 Nevertheless, even
these positive portrayals have ultimately far less to do with China than
with their authors, who are motivated primarily by their desire to criti
cize their own domestic conditions - by pointing out that even the
Chinese had done better. As Derrida observes, in such cases China
still remains a "domestic representation" that is praised "only for the
purpose of designating a lack and to define the necessary correc
tions"166 - or, in the words of a Portuguese merchant in Macao, to
make it "knowen how farre these Gentiles do herein exceed many
Christians. "167
The oscillation in Western evaluations of Chinese law reflects in
part shifting evaluations of the rationality of the Chinese language.
Rationality, after all, is one of the identifying features of modern
law,168 and law in turn is intimately connected with language and the
categories it offers for legal expression. Again, the footprints lead to
Hegel, who operationalizes his entire Orientalist arsenal to describe
the nature of the Chinese language. That the Chinese language is not
phonetic but "represents the ideas themselves by signs" is evidence to
Hegel that it has not "matured" and reached the level of Western lan
guages. Indeed, because of the multiplicity of pictorial representations
required, the Chinese writing system is a fundamentally inadequate

162. Compare id. at 108, with NIETZSCHE, supra note 96, at 99.
1 63. HEGEL, supra note 140, at 142.
164. See generally BASIL GUY, THE FRENCH IMAGE OF CHINA BEFORE AND AFTER
VOLTAIRE 261 (1963) (observing, for example, Voltaire's high regard for what he viewed as
the Chinese "cult of justice" and "the absence of fanaticism or religious prejudice").
165. 1 JOHN WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 178 (1936)
(quoting a Spanish missionary); see also MATTEO RICCI, CHINA IN THE SIXTEENTH
CENTURY: THE JOURNALS OF MATTEO RICCI: 1 583-1610, at 43 (Louis J. Gallagher trans.,
1953) (finding Chinese law predictable and non-arbitrary in that a code, once promulgated
by the founder of a dynasty, "cannot be changed without good reason").
166. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 161 , at 179. Ironically, the engage
ment of Derrida himself with China is not necessarily much deeper: "the East is never seri
ously studied or deconstructed in the Derridean text." Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Preface,
in id., at lxxxii.

1 67. WIGMORE, supra note 165, at 155 (quoting a Portuguese merchant).
168. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER (1983) (analyzing the place of "formal
legal rationality" in Weber's sociology).
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instrument "for representing and imparting thought."169 The same no
tion echoes in Weber, who observes that "Chinese thought has re
mained rather stuck in the pictorial and the descriptive. "170 And, like
Hegel, Weber confirms the dire consequences of this unfortunate
"fact": "The power of logos, of defining and reasoning, has not been
accessible to the Chinese,"171 and, indeed, " [t]he very concept of logic
remained absolutely alien" to Chinese thought.172
As a counterexample, consider Leibniz, a Sinophile par excellence.
For him, the ideographic, unphonetic Chinese script was a blueprint
for the great Enlightenment project of a. "universal" language that
communicates ideas "directly," like algebraic signs.173 Leibniz's analy
sis ignores the fact that the Chinese script does include phonetic ele
ments. Yet, whether it was considered an anachronism or a kind of po
tential linguistic algebra, the Chinese language constituted a nearly
insuperable barrier to many Westerners. From early on, legal observ
ers of China emphasized the problem of studying a legal system "bur
ied in a language by far the least accessible to a foreign student of any
that was ever invented by man," as Sir George Thomas Staunton put it
hyperbolically in the introduction to his pioneering 1810 translation of
the Qing Code.174 Given Orientalism's facile assumptions about the
close interrelations between language, ahistoricity, and the irrational
ity of the Chinese, we are hardly surprised to learn that, in the opinion
of an officer of the British East India Company, "so arbitrary" are the
laws of Chinese as to be "contrary to all reason and justice."175
169. HEGEL, supra note 140, at 135. For more extensive analyses of Hegel's
(mis)understanding of the Chinese language, see DERRIDA, The Pit and the Pyramid, supra
note 150, at 69, and SAUSSY, supra note 151.
170. WEBER, THE RELIGION OF CHINA, supra note 17, at 125.
171. Id.
172 Id.
173. See OLIVIER ROY, Leibniz et le Chinois comme langue universelle [Leibniz and
Chinese as universal language], in LEIBNIZ ET LA CHINE [LEIBNIZ AND CHINA] 135 (Librai
rie Philosophique, Paris, 1972). Ironically, what ultimately makes Chinese writing such an
attractive model to Leibniz is precisely its (now idealized, not demonized) ahistoricity:
"What liberates [the unphonetic] Chinese script from the voice is also that which, arbitrarily
and by the artifice of invention, wrenches it from history and gives it to philosophy."
DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 161, at 76. For analyses of Leibniz's project of
finding a universal basis for Christianity and Confucianism, see DAVID MUNGELLO,
LEIBNIZ AND CONFUCIANISM: THE SEARCH FOR ACCORD (1977); CHRISTIA MERCER,
LEIBNIZ'S METAPHYSICS: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 50-51 (2001) (describing
Leibniz's "ecumenical optimism" in discovering of elements of Christianity and natural law
in Confucianism); see also GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, WRITINGS ON CHINA (Daniel J.
Cook & Henry Rosemont, Jr. trans., 1994).
174. Sir George Thomas Staunton, Translator's Preface, in TA TSING LEU LEE; BEING
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS, AND A SELECTION FROM SUPPLEMENTARY STATUTES OF THE
PENAL CODE OF CHINA V, at xiii (Strahan & Preston, London, 1810) (emphasis added).
175. 1 HOSEA BALLOU MORSE, CHRONICLES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO
CHINA, 1635-1834, at 168 (1926). It is noteworthy that although Western images of Chinese
law have never been monolithic, Jesuits' and other early modern observers' accounts were
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Dated as the debates on the putative irrationality of the Chinese
language may sound, they have their contemporary variants. With
China having assumed sovereignty over Hong Kong, the common law
of the former British colony is now being translated into Chinese. The
debate surrounding this project betrays a persistent Orientalist skepti
cism regarding the possibility of crossing what Joseph Needham calls
"the great barrier between ideographic and alphabetic languages,"176
and, by extension, the feasibility of administering justice in Chinese.177
Indeed, one can only recall the predominantly French origins of the
common law and the early Francophones' ardent belief that "really
the Law is scarcely expressible properly in English.''178
In any event, even as the West lurches from "ethnocentric scorn"
to "an hyperbolical admiration" and back - as Derrida characterizes
West's self-referential histories of the Orient - China remains a pow
erful signifier.179 Continuing this pattern, in an ostensibly dramatic re
versal of American Orientalism, Chinese Americans appear to have
undergone a striking metamorphosis in the late twentieth-century:
Orientalist discourses no longer operate to exclude the Chinese from
immigration, and Chinese Americans have been promoted from rep-

predominantly positive. However, as missionaries were replaced by traders as the dominant
group of Westerners in China, the perceptions of Chinese law grew increasingly dim. See,
e.g., MILLER, supra note 154, at 24-25 (observing that American nineteenth-century traders'
images of China were dominated by "criticism of China's despotism, vindictive system of
law, and social injustice"); see also Gregory Blue, China and Western Social Thought in the
Modern Period, in CHINA AND HISTORICAL CAPITALISM: GENEALOGIES OF SINOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE 57 (Timothy Brook & Gregory Blue eds., 1999) (analyzing emergence of in
creasingly negative views of China in European social thought).
176. Joseph Needham, The Translation of Old Scientific and Technical Texts, in
ASPECTS OF TRANSLATION 12 (A.H. Smith ed., 1958). For postcolonial analyses of the
problems of translation, see LYDIA H. LIU, TRANSLINGUAL PRACTICE: LITERATURE,
NATIONAL CULTURE, AND TRANSLATED MODERNITY - CHINA, 1 900-1937 (1995) and
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, The Politics of Translation, in OUTSIDE IN THE
TEACHING MACHINE 179 (1993).
177. For a review of the terms of this debate, see Derek Roebuck & King-kui Sin, The
Ego and I and Ngo: Theoretical Problems in the Translation of the Common Law into Chi
nese, in HONG KONO, CHINA AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 1 85 (Raymond Wacks
ed., 1993).
178. ROGER NORTH, A DISCOURSE ON THE STUDY OF LAWS 13 (London 1824), quoted
in Roebuck & Sin, supra note 177, at 193. Of course, once the English did establish their lan
guage as a "legal" one, it was used to maintain their identity as a "rational" people by having
parliamentary committees make "findings" about the neighboring linguistic communities such as, "The Welsh language distorts the truth, favors fraud, and abets perjury." REGINALD
COUPLAND, WELSH AND SCOTTISH NATIONALISM 186 (1954) (quoting education commis
sioners for the House of Commons in 1846). The Irish received similar treatment as subjects
of language and law: "the English regarded traditional Irish culture - and its most impres
sive achievement, the Brehon laws - with the utmost disdain, as the work of mere barbari
ans. Gaelic, like Welsh, was not conducive to rational expression." MICHAEL HECHTER,
INTERNAL COLONIALISM: THE CELTIC FRINGE IN BRITISH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
1536-1966, at 77 (1975) (citation omitted).
179. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOOY' supra note 161, at 80.
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resentatives of the "Yellow Peril" to members of the so-called "Model
Minority."180 Nevertheless, although Chinese Americans are seen as
having successfully integrated into the American economy, they are
still notably distrusted as legal and political subjects.181 Rather than
expressing their political will primarily through voting or other regular
channels of participatory democracy, Chinese Americans now use
their superior economic power to finance political campaigns, the me
dia suggest182 - or else they simply sell national secrets to China, or to
whoever pays the most.183
Although the power of Orientalist tropes lies precisely in their ir
refutability by empirical evidence, it bears repeating that even histori
cally, from the very genesis of the Chinese immigration exclusion, the
perception of Chinese Americans as being either unable or unwilling
to resort to law for their rights has been simply inaccurate. Even
though one prominent justification for the Chinese exclusion laws was
the putative inability of the Chinese even to comprehend the notion of
individual rights and thus qualify for America's " Republican form of
Govemment,"184 ironically the immediate response of the Chinese to
their exclusion was the paradigmatically "American" one: to insist on
their legal rights in federal court.185

1 80. See ROBERT s. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE
NATION-STATE 53-58 (1999). That is, Asian Americans as a group are perceived to be dili
gent, well-educated and economically successful
i.e., a Model Minority. Although the
Model Minority myth has been debunked repeatedly, it retains its dual appeal: it generates
and maintains an image of "bad" minorities, and at the same time it masks the ways in which
Asian Americans in fact remain socially and economically marginalized. See Bob H. Suzuki,
Education and the Socialization of Asian Americans: A Revisionist A nalysis of the "Model
Minority" Thesis, 4 AMERASIA J. 23 (no. 2, 1977); see also Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minor
ity, Yellow Peril: Functions of "Foreignness" in the Construction of Asian American Legal
Identity, 4 ASIAN L.J. 71 (1997).
181. For an analysis of Asian Americans' ineligibility for full political citizenship, see
generally Volpp, supra note 155. See also the classic study of the political and social exclu·
sion of Chinese-Americans by VICTOR G. NEE & BRETT DE BARY NEE, LONGTIME
CALIFORN': A DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF AN AMERICAN CHINATOWN (1972).
-

1 82. See L. Ling-chi Wang, Race, Class, Citizenship and Extraterritoriality: Asian Ameri
cans and the 1996 Campaign Finance Scandal, 24 AMERASIA 1 (1998).
183. See WEN Ho LEE & HELEN ZIA, MY COUNTRY VERSUS ME (2001); Neil Gotanda,
Racialization ofAsian Americans and African Americans: Racial Profiling and the Wen Ho
Lee Case, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000) .
1 84. Cf. supra text accompanying note 156.
185. See Christian G. Fritz, A Nineteenth Century "Habeas Corpus Mill": The Chinese
Before the Federal Courts in California, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 347 (1988).
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TOWARD AN ETHICS OF 0RIENTALISM

China . is the reward of the right kind of reading . . . . [E]ach got the
China he deserved and to which his understanding offigural language en
titled him. 186
.

.

- Haun Saussy

Although the focus of this Article is on sketching the broad con
tours of certain historically dominant representations of Chinese law
in the West, one may still fairly ask what, if anything, all of this has to
do with understanding China and Chinese law today. How should we
use "law" to understand China, or "China" to understand law?
The moral of this Article is not to issue a categorical imperative
that comparative lawyers must cease Orientalizing China, that it must
never constitute a mere means in our own projects of legal self
definition. While such moralizing is perhaps rhetorically satisfying, a
categorically anti-Orientalist morality is simply not possible. Preju
dices, in the neutral Gadamerian sense, can only be managed, not
eliminated. As Gadamer observes, for better or worse, "the funda
mental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against preju
dice itself, which denies tradition its power."187 In the end, "belonging
to a tradition is a condition of hermeneutics,"188 and traditions inevita
bly prejudice us in the sense of disposing us to see the world in light of
our preconceptions - whether those preconceptions be positive or
negative.
Thus, there is no innocent knowledge to be had, and we have little
choice but to Orientalize - to always anticipate China and its legal
traditions in terms of our own biases. Moreover, not only are we inevi
tably always engaged in Othering and essentializing China and
Chinese law as we seek to understand them, but the Chinese, likewise,
essentialize us, the West. Moreover, both we and the Chinese essen
tialize our own traditions as well: the Chinese "self-Orientalize" and
Americans "self-Americanize," as it were.
As examples of Chinese self-essentialization, consider again the
fact that for centuries it was the official, state-sponsored Confucian
view that law played only a minimal role in governance of the Chinese
empire which was ideally ruled by morality - yet in fact the state de
veloped a sophisticated legal system to carry out its policies. But inso
far as Confucianism privileged law over morality and the state identi

186. SAUSSY, supra note 151, at 1 51 .
187. OADAMER, supra note 24, a t 270.
188. Id. at 291; see also id. at 277 ("[I]t is necessary to fundamentally rehabilitate the
concept of prejudice.").
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fied Chinese-ness with Confucianism, it was ideologically imperative
to insist that China was a government of men (of superior virtue), not
of (mere instrumental) laws.189
Consider again also the notion of a stable, enduring China. This
myth is not just a Western fantasy but a Confucian one as well.
Confucius himself insisted, rather disingenuously, that his project of
reforming Chinese state and society was simply a return to a past
Golden Age - a mere reaffirmation of an ancient tradition rather
than a fundamental reorganization of a world that he found corrupt
and lacking in morality.190 Indeed, ever since Confucius (and even be
fore him), nearly all Chinese projects of fundamental social transfor
mation have sought to retroject their Utopias onto a distant past, so as
to honor a strong cultural prejudice against radical change.
To be sure, since the Communists' rise to power in 1949, at least
the Chinese state has rejected the past unequivocally as a source of le
gitimacy. However, even that rejection is premised on a self
Orientalization of that past. That is, although the Sinicized version of
Marxism may well represent a significant transformation, even the
Maoist variety is ultimately driven by a need to see the Chinese past as
irredeemably "feudal," stagnantly waiting for Communism to rescue it
from its ahistorical trap. Hence, many Chinese historians have inter
nalized some of Marx's Orientalist understandings of the world as part
of their self-understanding.191 The accomplished legal historian Jing
189. Cf supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
190. Cf CONFUCJ.US, THE ANALECTS, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (D.C. Lau trans., 1979) ("The
Master said, 'I transmit but do not innovate; I am truthful in what I say and devoted to an
tiquity . . . . ' ").
191. On Marxist historiography in China, see generally ARIF DIRLIK, REVOLUTION
AND HISTORY: 0RIGrNS OF MARXIST HISTORIOGRAPHY IN CHINA, 1919-1937 (1978). Cf
PARTHA CHATTERJEE, NATIONALIST THOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD: A
DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE? (1986) (analyzing the adoption of the European ideology of "na
tionalism" by the Indian state). To the extent that "Chineseness" is premised on not being
"Western," Wang Ning calls the phenomenon "Occidentalism" - ultimately another mode
of self-Orientalism in that it still defines itself primarily in relation to "the West." See Wang
Ning, Orientalism versus Occidentalism?, 28 NEW LITERARY HIST. 57 (1997). As an exam
ple, consider the satirical observation made by Lu Xun, China's leading literary modernist,
in 1934:
(B]ecause we have been suffering from [foreign] aggression for years, we make enemies to
this 'foreign air.' We even go one step further and deliberately run counter to this 'foreign
air': as they like to act, we would sit still; as they talk science, we would depend on divina
tion; as they dress in short shirts, we would put on long robes; as they emphasize hygiene, we
would eat flies; as they are strong and healthy, we would rather stay sick.
Lu Xun, Reflections Starting from My Son's Photographs, quoted in Zhang Longxi, Western
Theory and Chinese Reality, supra note 68, at 105-06; see also CHEN XIAOMEI,
0CCIDENTALISM: A THEORY OF COUNTER-DISCOURSE IN POST-MAO CHINA 5 (1995) (ob
serving that Chinese "Occidentalism," or self-definition against the Western Other, is "pri
marily a discourse that has been evoked by various and competing groups within Chinese
society fo r a variety of different ends, largely, though not exclusively, within domestic Chi
nese politics"). For an alternative definition of "Occidentalism" (referring to the West's self
essentialization), see infra note 195.
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Junjian, for example, paints a rich, even dynamic view of the legal
regulation of the economy during the Qing - yet, almost contradict
ing his own evidence, in the end he nevertheless concludes that
"Chinese law was permeated by the same basic principles from begin
ning to end."192
And just as the Chinese tend to self-Orientalize their own past as
lawless and unchanging, I have suggested above that Americans tend
to "self-Americanize" themselves as inherently legal. Intriguingly,
although Americans often do "place a high cultural valuation on
change,"193 which also serves to condemn China's legal tradition as
"stagnant," in the domestic context Americans are capable of valuing
lack of change as well. Just as Confucianism sought political stability
in respecting the forms of governance established by the founder of
each dynasty, so many Americans too take pride in the fact that their
Constitution has remained unaltered since its adoption in the wake of
the Founding.194 Yet while a real or perceived lack of change in
192. Jing Junjian, Legislation Related to the Civil Economy in the Qing Dynasty, in CIVIL
LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA, supra note 21, at 42, 82; see also Chen Duanhong,
Opposition - The Future of Chinese Constitutionalism from the Perspective ofA dministrative
Litigation, 4 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [PEKING u. L.J.] 1 (1995) (painting a Hegelian image of
traditional Chinese law as paternalistic rule where subjects were reduced to the position of
children); Liang Zhiping, Explicating "Law": A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and
Western Legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55, 91 (1989) ("Obviously, China's traditional legal
concepts are incapable of accommodating the rich essence of modern legal concepts . . . . We
must expose and criticize past history and consciously recognize the traditions that we in
herited unintentionally."). And just as the indigenous Chinese legal tradition tends to be re
duced to an Orientalist stereotype, idealized notions of Western law have come to constitute
the paradigmatic form of "law." See, e.g. , Gao Hongjun, Two Modes of the Rule of Law, in
YIFA ZHIGUO, JIANSHE SHEHUI ZHUYI FAZHI GUOJIA (RULING THE COUNTRY
ACCORDING TO LAW, CONSTRUCTING A SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW STATE] 262, 266-67 (Liu
Hainian et al. eds., 1996) (relying on Roberto Unger's Eurocentric account of legal devel
opment). Cf Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental, supra note 59. Ironically, the "cutting edge"
of much contemporary Chinese legal theory thus consists of retellings of European Enlight
enment narratives. See, e.g., Yan Cunsheng, Rationalization ls the Core of Legal Moderniza
tion, 1 FAXUE (LAW SCIENCE MONTHLY] 8 (1997); Du Wanhua, The Dualistic Social Struc
ture and Jurisprudential Reflections Thereon, 1 XIANDAI FAXUE [MODERN LEGAL STUDIES]
5 (1996) (drawing on Hobbes, Kant, Locke and Rousseau, among others); Bei Yue, Human
Rational Agreement and the Origin of Legal Rules, 1 XIANDAI FAXUE [MODERN LEGAL
STUDIES] 8 (1997) (social contract narrative). To be sure, there is nothing "wrong" about
legal self-Orientalism. As Gayatri Spivak observes, "Programs of cultural self-representation
are never correct or incorrect. They are the substance of cultural inscriptions." SPIVAK, A
CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON, supra note 64, at 341. Yet insofar as legal self
Orientalism is based on an incomplete reading of the Chinese past, it can at least be criti
cized for seeking to ground itself in untenable history and for unnecessarily restricting the
ability of contemporary Chinese law reformers to draw on the resources of China's legal
past. In this context, it is perhaps noteworthy, as Xiaobing Tang observes, that Said's critique
of Orientalism "has never really entered into the general cultural-intellectual discourse [of
contemporary China] with a palpable impact." Xiaobing Tang, Orienta/ism and the Question
of Universality: The Language of Contemporary Chinese Literary Theory, 1 POSITIONS 389,
389 {1993).
193. COHEN, D ISCOVERING HISTORY, supra note 39, at 6.
194. To be sure, the Constitution has been amended several times, but at least in the
popular view - if not that of constitutional theorists - Americans continue to live under
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China's political culture is usually classified negatively as "stagnation,"
a similar lack of change in the American case represents the positive
quality of "stability": not slavery to tradition but an admirable
fidelity to who We the People "really" are. Indeed, consider the tre
mendous amounts of scholarly energy that constitutional Originalists,
for example, devote to explaining why contemporary Americans ought
to be ruled by an agreement hammered out by a group of property
owning white men in Philadelphia in 1 789. The expectation that these
men should be able to rule us from their graves is surely as much a
form of ancestor worship as any advocated by Confucius, yet here it is
one that confirms Americans' identity as essentially, solidly Ameri
can.19s
But if this is indeed the melancholic conclusion - we cannot help
essentializing others, and even ourselves - what is a comparative law
yer to do? If we accept the premise that prejudices ultimately consti
tute the very "conditions of understanding,"196 we need not find an
Archimedean point of observation in order to understand at all: per
fection is not required, even if we may wish to strive for it. Instead of a
simplistic morality of anti-Orientalism - "Thou shalt not Orientalize"
- which would effectively end comparative law, we are allowed to
proceed with our enterprise. Indeed, comparison is ultimately the only
way for us to encounter and enter into relationships with others.197
Yet while morality may have no place in comparative law, ethics
must. By "morality," I mean normative systems that posit a pre-given
moral subject and then elaborate guidelines for proper actions by that
subject.198 By "ethics," in contrast, I refer to normative systems that
are concerned, not with what a pre-given subject may or may not do,
but rather with the construction of that subject. Instead of assuming an
ethical subject and then regulating it, ethics regulates the conditions
under which subjects emerge. What comparative law needs, then, is an
ethics of Orientalism, rather than an impossible morality of anti
Orientalism.

the "same" Constitution. Cf BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991 ).
195. As another example of Confucian-like self-projection into tradition, consider
Western appeals to an idealized "classical antiquity" (to be strictly distinguished from East
ern-influenced Hellenism, for example) and the need to "preserveO it within Western cul
ture as the heritage of the past." GADAMER, supra note 24, at 287. Reminding us that
Orientalist discourses are constitutive not only of the Oriental as an object but also of the
Western subject, James Carrier uses the term "Occidentalism" in a similar fashion to de
scribe the ways in which anthropological studies of "the Orient" have contributed to the ide
alization of "the West." James G. Carrier, Occidentalism: The World Turned Upside-Down,
19 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 195 (1992).
196. GADAMER, supra note 24, at 277-3fJ7.
197. Cf. CHARLES TAYLOR, Comparison, History, Truth, in PHILOSOPHICAL
ARGUMENTS 147, 150 (1995) ("[O]ther-understanding is always in a sense comparative.").
198. Christianity and Kantian ethics are paradigmatic examples of morality in this sense.
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That is, even as we continue to compare and necessarily Oriental
ize as well, we must consider the effects that our comparisons have on
others.199 To the extent that the categories we employ always impose
limits on what we can discover in the world, it is a fundamental effect
of our acts of comparison that they in part produce the objects that are
being compared - for example, the American "legal subject" and the
Chinese "non-legal non-subject." We must therefore consider the
ways in which our comparisons subject others, in both senses of the
term: recognize them as free subjects and also limit their freedom as
subjects.200
In light of this ethical imperative, how should we go about evalu
ating various legal Orientalisms? Let us consider, for example, the ap
plication of Chinese law in Hong Kong in recent times. It has often
consisted of translating Orientalist notions into practice. Indeed, in the
colonial legal system the distinction between Western representations
of Chinese law and Chinese law as a local material practice essentially
collapsed, as the British courts in Hong Kong frequently turned to
Orientalist accounts of Chinese law to construct a body of law that the
courts then applied to the native population as their own, idiosyncratic
notion of "Chinese law." Technically, this was accomplished with the
aid of expert witnesses and by interpreting Western observers' histori
cal writings on the subject.201 The reason for the need to consult out199. The ethical conception of Orientalism can be also thought of as a kind of "strategic
essentialism," as elaborated by SPIVAK, Subaltern Studies, supra note 64, i.e., a practice of
essentializing the other for only certain purposes and with an awareness of its consequences.
200. Cf supra note 112.
201. This written corpus consists of a hodgepodge of archaic - often openly hostile legal anecdotes by missionaries, Orientalist historians, armchair anthropologists, and the oc
casional British lawyer. In a chain of judicial citation, over time this dubious jurisprudence
acquired an authority that required no basis other than its own status as precedent: "one
author synthesizes various sources, is cited in a judgment which becomes a precedent to be
compared with other authors using the same sources, and so on." PETER WESLEY-SMITH,
THE SOURCES OF HONG KONG LAW 216 (1994). It is indeed quite astonishing that as late as
the end of the 1980s - by which time there certainly existed detailed, far more competent
studies of late-Qing Chinese law and custom - Hong Kong courts continued to rely on a
dated committee report that in tum cited as "authority" various archaic nineteenth-century
texts. See, for example, In re Estate of Ng Shum (No. 2), [1 990] 1 H.K.L.R. 67, which draws
repeatedly on HONGKONG COMMITTEE ON CHINESE LAW AND CUSTOM (1953), a report
compiled by a governor's committee commissioned in 1948. The case expressly cites to the
report's references to such Orientalist gems as a social "history" written by the British Arch
deacon of Hongkong, JOHN HENRY GRAY, CHINA: A HISTORY OF THE LAWS, MANNERS,
AND CUSTOMS OF THE PEOPLE (1878), and J. DYER BALL, THINGS CHINESE: BEING NOTES
ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH CHINA 392 (1892) (containing entries such as
" Topsy-Turvydom . . . The Chinese are not only at our antipodes with regard to position on
the globe, but they are our opposites in almost every action and thought."). Going beyond
the report's contents, the case even cites Edward Harper Parker's relentless effort to reduce
late-Qing family law to the categories of early Roman law - on the conceit that Qing law
was at the developmental stage "of the Roman law anterior to the publication of the Twelve
Tables, - 2,200 years ago." Parker, supra note 137, at 69. Although modern Hong Kong
courts have used expert witnesses as well, those expert witnesses have tended simply to cor
roborate the inherited jurisprudence. As Peter Wesley-Smith described the situation toward
.
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side experts lay in one of the foundational legal axioms of British co
lonialism: "as native law is foreign law, it must be proved as any other
fact."202 This principle - worthy of Borges - swiftly and effectively
confounded "native" and "foreign" as well as "law" and "fact," so that
by the time the British were done with it, native Chinese law was nei
ther "native" nor "law." And once the resulting vacuum was filled
with Orientalist projections, what was left was often less than "Chi
nese" as well.
Thus, if legal Orientalism is ordinarily a set of Western representa
tions of Chinese law that have grown out of, and around, actual legal
practices - even when those representations may themselves be quite
fantastic - in Hong Kong the dynamic has been reversed: there, legal
practices have frequently been material enactments of legal
Orientalism.203 This fact in itself is of course not an indictment of the
resulting body of law, as purity of cultural or national origin is hardly a
guarantee of quality, nor is such purity even attainable, except by self
Orientalization of one's past. What is ethically suspect about this
Orientalism is its paradigmatically colonial relationship to the Chinese
non-legal non-subject: the law affords no role in its construction for
the Chinese who live under it.
Yet Hong Kong, unlike most of the rest of China, has an actual
colonial history, and it is thus no surprise that the local legal subject
has been colonized by the West. But what about legal Orientalism in
understanding the People's Republic of China, for example? Since the
end of the Cold War, law has become a major American export
item.204 Various rule of law projects are being offered to China with a
particular vigor.205 These projects draw implicitly on the idea that
the end of the British colonial rule, most "expert 'witnesses' " had no direct knowledge of
the subject of their testimony; rather, their expertise lay in the fact that they were "scholars
learned in the small corpus of literature on Chinese law and custom." WESLEY-SMITH,
supra, at 216.
202. Hughes v. Davies, RENN. 550, 551 (1909).
203. This description applies certainly to much of the production of "Chinese law" in
colonial Hong Kong. The status of that body of law - essentially late-Qing law and custom
- in postcolonial Hong Kong is murkier, but at least under a formal analysis it still remains
valid to the extent that the British still enforced it on the eve of the handover. See Ruskola,
Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship, supra note 15, at 1725-26; see also Barbara E.
Ward, Rediscovering Our Social and Cultural Heritage in the New Territories, 20 J. HONG
KONG BRANCH J. ROYAL ASIATIC Soc. 1 1 6, 121 (1980) (noting that British colonialism has
functioned "in one sense like a refrigerator, 'freezing' the local social and cultural systems at
more or less the stage they had been when the British first arrived, and to a surprisingly large
extent inhibiting changes that might otherwise have happened").
204. See e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 95
(1998). For a critical analysis, see Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69
B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989).
205. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?
Problems and Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored 'Rule of Law' Reform Projects in the People's
Republic of China, 18 PAC. BASIN L.J. 64 (2000). On the multiplicity of meanings of "rule of
law" in the context of China, see Deborah Cao, "Fazhi" vs/and/or Rule of Law? A Semiotic
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China's indigenous legal resources are inadequate to the task of gov
erning China and that China is dependent on Western assistance in
putting together a "real" legal order. The underlying view is, again,
that China is essentially static and would be consigned to the dustbin
of History, but for the interventions of the West. This implicit view has
come under criticism in the social sciences, where critics call it the im
pact-response paradigm. The main structural assumption of the para
digm is that China's so-called "modernization" has indeed been a "re
sponse" to the "impact" of its nineteenth-century meeting with the
West.206
Today, many American policy-makers still view the Chinese as es
sentially law-less and unindividuated subjects of Oriental Despotism,
the latest despot being the Communist Party, rather than the imperial
state. In its current incarnation this view underwrites the political and
economic project of making China open its markets for Western
investment and trade: those favoring China's entry into the World
Trade Organization and other international commercial and trade law
regimes claim that China's participation will eventually transform its
population into viable subjects of the rule of law. This particular
Orientalist view risks rendering the mission of American law in China
from (relatively harmless) legal tourism to the imposition of neo
liberalism under the alibi of law reform.207
There is also a deep irony to this view, given that in the American
domestic context it is precisely the all too successful economic integra
tion of Chinese Americans that renders them suspect as legal subjects:

Venture into Chinese Law, 14 INT'L J. SEMIOTICS L. 223 {2001); Randall Peerenboom, Rul·
ing the Country in Accordance with Law: Reflections on the Rule and Role of Law in Con·
temporary China, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 315 {1999); see also Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward
a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 125 {1999); Carol A.G. Jones, Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law:
An A lternative Trajectory of Legal Change in China, 3 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 195 {1994).
206. See COHEN, D ISCOVERING HISTORY, supra note 39, at 58-96. The classic articula·
lion of the paradigm in its modern form is the influential China 's Response to the West, first
published in 1954. See JOHN K. FAIRBANK & SSU·YU TENG, CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE
WEST (1 954). For a corrective view, see, for example, JONATHAN SPENCE, To CHANGE
CHINA: WESTERN ADVISORS IN CHINA 1620-1960 (1980). See also Alford, Law? What
Law?, supra note 13, at 49-50; Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship, supra
note 15, at 1717.
207. This is not to suggest that there is no indigenous Chinese demand for law reform.
Quite clearly, many Chinese do favor law reform, as well as China's participation in the
W.T.O. There is nothing inherently objectionable about the pursuit of these goals in them·
selves. What is questionable is these projects' implicit assumption (made equally commonly
by both American law-exporters and Chinese law-importers) about the self-evident West·
ern-ness of all possible forms of legal modernity, and the expectation that the expansion of
markets will naturally "civilize" Chinese subjects of despotism into (liberal) legal subjects.
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even as citizens, they are believed to exercise their agency primarily
through economic rather than legal and political means, at least ac
cording to their media portrayals.208
Yet whatever the differences among the above Orientalisms, they
support an overly idealized self-image of the American legal subject
and an unduly negative view of the Chinese (non)legal (non)subject:
Chinese are ruled by morality, Americans by law; Chinese are lem
mings, Americans individuals; Chinese are despotic, Americans demo
cratic; China is changeless, America dynamic. Together, these notions
form an analytically indissoluble complex of meanings so that often to
invoke one is to invoke them all. The problem is not that these
Orientalisms make assumptions about Chinese legal subjectivity that is unavoidable - but that these assumptions essentially foreclose
the possibility of any real communication between the American legal
subject and its Chinese would-be counterpart. To the extent that they
view the American legal subject as the paradigmatic and authentic
case, they implicitly authorize it to teach the Chinese how to become
(real) legal subjects. And until that lesson has been imparted, there is
little that Chinese law can offer to American law, which is hardly a
promising recipe for cross-cultural understanding. Indeed, insofar as
this conception of the legal subject holds the potential for delegiti
mizing all other legal traditions, legal Orientalism is built into the very
definition of "law," which, along with the kind of individual subjectiv
ity it implies, becomes one of the West's key contributions to the
modern world.209
Although legal narcissism may not be fatal and perhaps only gives
us the (dim) view of Chinese law that we deserve, the Chinese cer
tainly deserve better. To be sure, it is only because of certain "funda
mental, enabling prejudices"210 that we can communicate with others
in the first place: our preconceptions of others in part enable those
others to emerge as subjects. Yet the same enabling prejudices inevi
tably also constrain those others: subjectivity never implies perfect
freedom. What distin�uishes one Orientalism from another, then, are
its uses and its effects: 1 1 How does it subject the other?
The ethical distinction is thus not between Orientalisms with nega
tive rather than positive prejudices, even if in the context of law
Orientalist myths tend to be quite overwhelmingly negative.212
Communitarian and other idealizations of the Chinese genius for me208. Cf supra text accompanying notes 182-183.
209. As Peter Fitzpatrick observes, manufacturing myths about other societies' law is an
inevitable part of legitimating one's own. See PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF
MODERN LAW (1992).
210. GADAMER, supra note 24, at 295.
211. Cf Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental, supra note 59.
212. Cf supra Section IV.B.
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diation and harmony, for example, tend to rely on similar notions of
Chinese non-legal non-subjectivity.213 Often, they represent an uncriti
cal Occidental acceptance of the Confucian ideological fiction that the
Chinese naturally delight in submitting themselves to the dictates of
group morality. And, like their negative counterparts, these positive
Orientalisms tend to posit law as inherently "Western" and "modern,"
effectively excluding the Chinese from both law as well as modernity.
To be sure, the point of such adoring Orientalisms is typically to criti
cize (the excesses of) Western legality, but by using Chinese non
legality as their counter-example, they reduce the Chinese to the ju
ridical equivalents of the noble savage: primitives happily untainted by
legal modernity.
Since it does not insist on a categorical distinction between positive
and negative Orientalisms, an ethics of comparison does not require
isolating Chinese legal practices from criticism.214 Enlightenment hu
manism may well have been deeply implicated in the rise of Western
imperialism, but as Dipesh Chakrabarty observes, it "has historically
provided a strong foundation on which to erect - both in Europe and
outside - critiques of socially unjust practices."215 In fact, we have an
ethical duty to be concerned about the practices of subjection - the
ways in which legal subjects are both enabled as well as disabled - in
China as well as at home.
Indeed, while insisting that our conception of the rule of law must
not be so closed and rigid as to categorically delegitimize all alterna
tives to political and social organization, I do not mean to suggest that
rule of law itself cannot be a legitimate model, for ourselves as well as
for others. Even if one supports the project of conceptualizing the no
tion of rule of law broadly, it seems beyond argument - tautological,
in fact - that China does not have rule of law in the Anglo-American
sense of the term.216 Hence, it seems more sensible not to ask " 'is
there rule of law in China?', but rather 'should there be rule of law in
China as we currently conceive the concept?' "217 In answering that
213. See, e.g., DAVID HALL & ROGER AMES, DEMOCRACY OF THE DEAD 216-20
(1999).
214. For an account of how human rights have figured in Chinese foreign relations in
the past decade or so, see MING WAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS:
DEFINING AND DEFENDING NATIONAL INTERESTS (2001).
215. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 31, at 4.
216. This definition is of course not the sole legitimate one. Randall Peerenboom, for
example, observes that Chinese "single-party socialism in which the Party plays a leading
role is in theory compatible with [the] rule of law - albeit not a liberal democratic version
of rule of law." Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of
Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161, 1 67 (2001).
217. Michael Dowdle, Heretical Laments: China and the Fallacies of "Rule of Law, " 11
CULTURAL DYNAMICS 287, 287 (1999) (emphasis added). As Donald Clarke notes, the
claim that China lacks a system of "rule of law" typically "leaves . . . unjustified its most cru-
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question, we ought to remain realistic about what the rule of law can
and cannot accomplish. This is not to prejudge the question: even if we
admit to the shortcomings of the rule of law, we may still find it ulti
mately desirable.218 However, it is not to anyone's benefit to sell it for
more than it is worth.219
Yet whether we articulate our criticisms in terms of human rights
or some other discourse, we must not proceed to condemn China
without a fair hearing. Often, Chinese legal practices are judged by ir
relevant character evidence, based on assumptions about the "des
potic" and "irrational" nature of the Chinese, for example. Equally
frequently, the Chinese legal system is presumed guilty before evi
dence has been even offered - or when it is offered, too often it is
Orientalist hearsay with a history of several centuries. And all too of
ten the entire process seems to center around us, and the project of
proving the innocence of our norms and practices, derivatively by

cial component: the ideal against which the Chinese legal system is identified and meas
ured." Clarke, supra note 65, at 9. A claim that the Chinese legal system is "lacking," even if
accurate, should be accompanied by an argument as to why any particular "lack" is undesir
able in the Chinese cultural, political, historical, and social context. There may well be good
arguments to support such claims, but those arguments must be made explicitly, not merely
implied, as if they followed inexorably from the mere fact that China regulates itself differ
ently.
218. As Yuanyuan Shen notes, whatever the conceptual and practical shortcomings of
the rule of law may be, it may well be "still useful for today's China." Yuanyuan Shen, Con
ceptions and Receptions of Legality, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA, supra
note 13, at 20, 21.
219. In this context, consider also the heated debates about the significance of "judicial
independence." Judicial independence may be a desirable goal, but, like rule of law itself, it
is ultimately only an instrumental value, not an end in itself. As Mark Ramseyer observes,
"Basic comparative research shows that independent judiciaries . . . are not common to free
dom-loving nations everywhere." J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (ln)Dependence of
Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 721, 721-22 (1994). Indeed, presumably
few Americans would wish to have a truly independent judiciary, a kind of unconstrained
judicial aristocracy; as Jerome Cohen cautions, "[a]n independent judiciary can frustrate ef
fective democratic government as easily as it can frustrate effective totalitarian govern
ment." Jerome Alan Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and "Judicial Independence":
1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REV. 967, 973 {1969); see also Jose J. Toharia, Judicial Independence
in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Contemporary Spain, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 475
(1975) (observing the coexistence of political authoritarianism with a considerable degree of
judicial independence). Moreover, "judicial independence" does not exist in unqualified
form even in its contemporary variant, nor has it had a stable historical meaning even in the
United States. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the
South? Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions about the Role ofthe Judiciary, 14
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817, 856 (1998) (criticizing many contemporary Southern state judges as
"not independent and committed to the rule of law"); Christine A. Desan, Remaking Con
stitutional Tradition at the Margin of the Empire: The Creation of Legislative Adjudication in
Colonial New York, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 257, 316 (1998) (calling for a recognition that the
colonial system of "legislative adjudication" - judicial decision-making by legislatures constitutes an integral part of the history of " American legality").
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challenging those of China. Finally, there is the ultimate structural
question of all Orientalist epistemologies: why is China always cast a
the defendant and the West as the judge - and the jury?220
Indeed, a judicial hearing is hardly the best metaphor for under
standing Chinese law. To return to Gadamer, his notion of the inter
pretive process as a "hermeneutic circle" is more descriptive of the
process of comparison as well, and normatively it certainly provides a
more desirable model for it. In Gadamer's terms, we begin our study
of Chinese law by projecting our own preconceptions, which we derive
from our own historical givens. Ideally, those preconceptions consti
tute only a provisional point of departure which we revise over time in order to project it again and again back on the world, with revisions
each time, depending on the extent to which (we believe) our preju
dices in fact describe the world. Yet at each point, our descriptions of
the world also affect its organization, so that there is no final terminus
for this enterprise. It is not the search for a fixed historical truth. In
stead, the process itself constitutes a truth produced by and in history.
The term "hermeneutic circle" in fact sounds more static than it
need be. It is not just a kind of infinite loop that makes us permanent
hostages of our current prejudices. On the contrary, "the circle pos
sesses an ontologically positive significance."221 It always entails the
possibility of a "fusion of horizons," a genuine encounter between dif
ferent hermeneutic systems.222 We have no choice but to bring our own
legal categories, our own mental apparatuses to the encounter, but as
we approach the Chinese legal system, we can question our categories.
Although we cannot put all of them at issue at once, we can certainly
question them at least one, or a few, at a time. Thus, while the herme
neutic circle is circular by definition, it is not static but can shift over
time. Its movement is not teleological, directed toward a final resting
place where the circle collapses on itself and shrinks into a singular
220. Cf Leti Volpp, Feminism vs. Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181 (2001)
(analyzing ways in which discourses of Western legal feminism posit non-Western cultural
practices as patriarchal and thus find multiculturalism oppositional to feminism).
221. GADAMER, supra note 24, at 266.
222. Id. at 306 ("[U)nderstanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly ex
isting by themselves.") (emphases omitted). To be sure, the language of separate horizons
coming together and fusing is infelicitous from the perspective of postcolonial comparative
law, insofa r as it implies the existence of discrete legal systems or discrete "legal horizons."
Yet Gadamer himself clarifies elsewhere that "these horizons supposedly existing by them
selves" are never discrete, never completely closed:
Just as the individual is never simply an individual because he is always in understanding
with others, so too the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction.
The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound
to any one standpoint, and can hence never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is,
rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person
that is moving.
Id. at 304.
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bull's eye, signifying that we have attained a complete, final under
standing. Rather, the circle moves as a circle in directions that are not
predetermined: to the left or the right, up or down, East or West.223
Consider what happened to Herbert Fingarette, a philosopher
trained in the Western canons, after he started paying serious atten
tion to Chinese thought:
When I began to read Confucius, I found him to be a prosaic and paro
Analects, seemed to me an ar
chaic irrelevance. Later, and with increasing force, I fo und him a thinker
chial moralizer; his collected sayings, the

with profound insight and with an imaginative vision of man equal in its
grandeur to any I know.224

The interpretation of Chinese law - and the interpretation of just
what constitutes "law" - implicates us inevitably in the process of in
terpreting ourselves as well: Who are we, as (legal) subjects? Thus, to
the extent that "law is truly an interpretive practice and interpretation
is ontological, we always risk change through our acts of legal inter
pretation."225
Thus, however marginalized comparative lawyers may feel them
selves, comparative law matters. In the broadest sense, we are all
comparative lawyers in that we necessarily understand ourselves le
gally against our ideas of others. Thus conceived, comparative law is
one site of subject formation, a practice through which we create oth
ers as well as ourselves. This power should not cause us to shrink from
acts of comparison - which we could not do even if we wanted to but simply to wield that power ethically, in ways that enable different
kinds of legal subjects to emerge, rather than fix and classify historical
subjects on the basis of the authenticity of their legal subjectivity.

223. Thanks to Erika Evasdottir for suggesting the idea of a hermeneutic circle that
moves in space.
224. HERBERT FINGARETTE, CONFUCIUS: THE SECULAR AS SACRED, at vii (1972).
225. J.M. Balkin, Understanding legal Understanding: The legal Subject and the Prob
lem of Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 1 63 (1993). Drawing on Gadamer, Balkin emphasizes
the "existential" or "ontological" nature of legal interpretation, id. at 159, observing that
"accounts of coherence in the social world . . . are, at bottom, driven by our need to believe
that our own beliefs are ordered, coherent, and rational." Id. at 115. Thus, many of us are
ontologically committed "to believing that [we] live in a basically just society, and that ele
ments of arbitrariness, unreasonableness, or injustice are the exception rather than the rule."
Id. at 147. When the assumptions of the Chinese legal tradition contradict those of our own,
they have the potential to throw into question the very coherence of our social world. Or, as
Balkin puts it, "[w)here the legal system becomes identified with general social authority,
attacks on the coherence of legal norms may be interpreted as attacks on the society itself."
Id. at n.80.
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EPILOGUE

Law is neither wrong nor right,
Law is only crime
Punished by place and times,
Law is only the clothes men wear
Anytime, anywhere,
Law is Good-morning and Good-night.226
- W.H. Auden

No matter how many times lawyers proclaim res ipsa loquitur,
things do not speak for themselves, and the uninterpreted fact remains
a legal and social fiction.227 Yet all too often, Western observers un
selfconsciously claim ultimate interpretive authority over Chinese law.
For an explanation of why this should be so, consider David Henry
Hwang's play M. Butterfly, in which he analyzes orientalized notions
of gender (among other things). One of Hwang's characters offers a
simple explanation for why a man can impersonate a woman perfectly:
"Because only a man knows how a woman is supposed to act."228 That
is, to the extent that a "real woman" is ultimately a male fantasy, it is
men who hold the key to the "truth" about "women." Our fetishized
views of law are no different. So long as we insist that "real" law is a
Western notion, it will always be the West that holds the key to the
truth about law.
Alas, there is no cross-cultural standard that would help us arrive
at a final definition of "law." Although natural law theories have (for
the most part) suffered a well-deserved death, in our less
self-conscious moments we nevertheless operate as though their dis
credited notions were still good law, and we forget that even the
seemingly most natural legal categories are ultimately cultural arti
facts. Yet the only natural law is that in China as elsewhere, people are
born and die - and, in between, they strive to instill the world, and
their selves, with meaning. In that project, law is one resource of signi
fication.

226. W.H. AUDEN, Law Like Love, in COLLECTED SHORTER POEMS 1927-1957, at 1 54
(1966), quoted in Mezey, supra note 82, at 5.
227. Cf GEERTZ, supra note 67, at 173 ( '[F]act configurations' are not merely things
found lying about in the world and carried bodily into court.").
"

228. DAVID HENRY HWANG, M BUTTERFLY ( 1 988). For an analysis of the sexual and
racial politics of M. Butterfly, see DAVID L. ENG, Heterosexuality in the Face of Whiteness, in
RACIAL CASTRATION: MANAGING MASCULINITY IN ASIAN AMERICA 1 37 (2001 )
.

